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Wireless Telecommunications, Infrastructure Security, and the NIMBY Problem
By Steven J. Eagle
This article explores the clash between federal policies encouraging wireless 
communications services and the application of local land use regulations to the siting of 
telecommunications towers. It concludes that Congress’s effort to strike a balance in the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 between local concerns on one hand and national commerce 
and homeland security on the other has proved vague in content and susceptible to procedural 
thickets that might make local parochialism impervious to challenge. The article suggests
statutory changes, including time limitations and the creation of  presumptions and safe harbor 
rules, that might better ba lance infrastructure development needs with local autonomy.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 (the “Act” or the “TCA”),1 was the first 
comprehensive overhaul of national telecommunications policy in over 60 years, amending the 
Communications Act of 1934.2 The TCA was intended to encourage low prices, the deployment 
of new technologies, and growth in telecommunications, resulting from increased competition 
through deregulation.3
Section 704 of the TCA provided for a new “National Wireless Telecommunications 
Siting Policy (“Section 704” or the “Siting Policy”).4 The Siting Policy is an important attempt to 
harmonize local autonomy in land use regulation and national commerce. The subsequent events 
of September 11, 2001 have brought into stark focus that telecommunications is a vital part of 
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1
 Pub. L. 104-104, Feb. 8, 1996, 110 Stat. 56 (codified in scattered provisions of 47 U.S.C.).
2
 The TCA amended the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 151, et. seq.
3 See discussion infra Part V.A.
4 Pub. L. 104-104 § 704 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 332 (c)(7)). For the text, see infra note 88.
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the Nation’s critical infrastructure for national security purposes.5 Intensifying the importance of 
both the national commerce and national security issues, reliance upon wireless 
telecommunications continues to grow rapidly.6
Given these important national concerns, wireless communications tower siting and 
design decisions take on an importance that goes beyond the more traditional tension between 
local government exercise of the police power to regulate land use and the private property rights 
of landowners which are protected under the federal constitution.
Section 704 attempts, within the context of legislation facilitating wireless 
communications growth, to respect the state and local authority over land use recognized by the
Supreme Court almost 80 years ago, in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.7 Indeed, the 
Siting Policy is entitled “Preservation of local zoning authority.”8 I argue that this effort has 
enjoyed only mixed success, and that this largely is attributable to the fact that Act reflects of 
some naïve assumptions about the nature of local land use regulation.9 While regulation should 
be done at the lowest appropriate level of government, there are systemic reasons why 
municipalities might not perform that function well–especially when national economic 
development and security are factored in. The concluding sections of this article suggests that the 
TCA should be amended so as to provide the practical balance between local and national 
interests that Congress might have intended.
5 See discussion infra Part III.
6 See discussion infra Part II.B.
7
 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
8
 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7). See discussion infra Part V. 
9 See discussion infra Part V.C.
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II. WIRELESS TELECOMMUNICATIONS – GROWTH AND DEREGULATION
A. Federal Regulation of Wireless Communications
Invoking its powers under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution,10 the federal 
government has regulated wireless communications since the Radio Act of 192711 declared 
governmental ownership of the radio frequency spectrum and preempted state laws that would 
interfere with its use.12 The Communications Act of 1934,13 which replaced the Radio Act, 
provided for the establishment of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC),14 which, in 
turn, has undertaken to regulation developing communications media under a public interest 
standard.15
B. Growth in Wireless Service
The Siting Policy employs the generic term “personal wireless services” (PWS) as a
descriptor for wireless telephony, including cellular phone and PCS phone service.16 Originally 
employed for automobile phones in 1974, analogue systems were developed for more general 
use through the mid 1980s. Thereafter, new digital phone services provided much clearer 
10 U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8 (“The Congress Shall have Power . . . To regulate Commerce . . . among the 
several States . . . .).
11 Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 69-632, 44 Stat. 1162 (codified at 47 U.S.C. §  119 (1927)).
12 See 47 U.S.C. §  119.
13 Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064  (codified at 47 U.S.C. §  151 
(1994)).
14 See 47 U.S.C. §  151 (1994).
15 See David W. Hughes, When NIMBYs Attack: The Heights to Which Communities Will Climb to 
Prevent the Siting of Wireless Towers, 23 J. CORP. L. 469, 474 (1998).
16 47 U.S.C. §  332(c)(7)(C)(i). (“the term ‘personal wireless services’ means commercial mobile 
services, unlicensed wireless services, and common carrier wireless exchange access services”).
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transmissions, with up to 20 times the number of calls that could be handled per channel.17 The 
next generation of technology, Personal Communications Systems (PCS), permits both voice and 
data signals to be transmitted to individuals outdoors and indoors and could replace other 
services in fixed location and mobile markets. However, PCS requires more advanced 
equipment. Most notably for present purposes, its higher frequency transmissions require smaller 
cells18 and, therefore, a multiplicity of cell towers.19
Cellular telephone service in the United States has grown at a phenomenal rate. 
According to a June 2003 FCC report, “[o]nce solely a business tool, wireless phones are now a 
mass-market consumer device. The overall wireless penetration rate (defined as the number of 
wireless subscribers divided by the total U.S. population) in the United States is now at 49 
percent.”20
Cellular service first was licensed by the Federal Communications Commission in 1983, 
and by the end of 1994, there were more than 22 million subscribers and cellular service was 
available to most Americans. During the past 20 years, the number of wireless telephone 
subscribers has mushroomed. Starting from a base of some 92,000 subscribers at the end of 
1984, the number exceeded 1.2 million by the end of 1987. It grew to over 11 million by the end 
of 1992, to over 55 million by the end of 1997, and to over 109 million by the end of 2000. By 
17 See generally, Gregory Tan, Note, Wading Through the Rhetoric of the Telecommunications Act of 
1996: Uncertainty of Local Zoning Authority Over Wireless Telecommunications Tower, 22 VT. L. REV. 
461, 470-471 (1997) (explaining the technology of cellular systems).
18 See, id. at 471-472.
19
 See Jaymes D. Littlejohn, The Impact of Land Use Regulation on Cellular Communications: Is 
Federal Preemption Warranted?, 45 FED. COMM. L.J. 247 (1993) (citing V. H. MacDonald, The Cellular 
Concept, 58 BELL SYS. TECH. J. 15, 30  (1979)).
20
 Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Annual 
Report and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions With Respect to Commercial Mobile Services, 
WT Docket No. 02-379, Eighth Report, FCC 03-150 (rel. Jul. 14, 2003), at  para. 101 (available at 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-03-150A1.pdf).
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the end of 2003, it had reached almost 159 million.21 According to CTIA, the wireless 
telecommunications industry trade association, in June 2004 there were almost 165,000,000 
current U.S. wireless subscribers.22 During 2002, the mobile telephone industry generated over 
$76 billion in revenues.23 This is not to say, however, that the wireless industry has surplus 
cash.24
In its Triennial Report, the FCC termed this growth in the number of mass market 
wireless subscriber lines “remarkable.” It added:
Over 90 percent of the United States population lives in counties served by three or more 
wireless operators; about two in five Americans now have a mobile phone. Prices for 
wireless service have steadily declined in recent years. . . . Notably, 3 to 5 percent of 
wireless customers use their wireless phone as their only phone.25
Although in 2002 fewer than two percent of subscribers had completely switched from 
landline to wireless telephone service, wireless technology is becoming increasingly competitive 
with landline telephone service.26 Also, mobile data services have grown rapidly, growing from 
21
 F.C.C. Industry Analysis and Technology Division, Wireline Competition Bureau, Trends in 
Telephone Service, p. 11-3, Table 11-1 (“Measures of Mobile Wireless Telephone Subscribers), May 
2004 (available at http://ftp.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/Reports/FCC-
State_Link/IAD/trend504.pdf) [hereafter 2004 Trends].
22 See the CITA web site, http://www.ctia.org/news_media/press/body.cfm?record_id=1408 (listing 
164,955,300 subscribers when visited on June 13, 2004).
23 Id. at para. 17.
24 See Laura H. Phillips & Jason E. Friedrich, Wireless: Can Regulatory “Business as Usual”
Continue?, 20 COMM. LAW. 12, 12 (Fall 2002) (noting that billions of dollars in equity have gone to build 
out cellular systems and that the industry is in “a classic early state and has yet to mature and produce the 
hoped-for financial payoff.”
25
 Review of Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers; 
Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 
Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications Capability, Report and Order 
and Order on Remand and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, CC Dkt. Nos. 01-338; 96-98; 98-147, 
p. 40, para. 53 (Aug. 21, 2003) (available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-03-
36A1.pdf) [hereinafter Triennial Review Order].
26
 Triennial Review Order at para. 228.
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between 2 and 2.5 million subscribers in 2000 to between 8 and 10 million subscribers in 2001.27
as “wireless technology continues to improve, wireless may become a more practical and 
attractive alternative to wireline for data services.” In confirmation of the increasing importance 
of wireless telephone service, the number of payphones in the U.S. has declined from over 2 
million in 1997 to under 1.5 million in 2003.28
III. WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS AND HOMELAND SECURITY
A. A History of Concern about Security and Telecommunications
Interest in the role of telecommunications in protecting the security of the United States is 
not a new phenomenon. In 1982, President Ronald Reagan established the President’s National 
Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee.29 The Committee was given responsibility 
to provide “information and advice from the perspective of the telecommunications industry with 
respect to the implementation of Presidential Directive 53 (PD/NSC-53), National Security 
Telecommunications Policy.”30 The federal government long has been cognizant of the need to 
incorporate private facilities into emergency planning, including an early precursor of wireless 
services, citizens band radio.31
In 1996, President William J. Clinton issued Executive Order No. 13010, noting that 
“[c]ertain national infrastructures are so vital that their incapacity or destruction would have a 
debilitating impact on the defense or economic security of the United States. These critical 
infrastructures include telecommunications . . . .”32 While telecommunications obviously is
27 Id. at para. 53 n.185.
28 2004 Trends at p. 7-8, Table 7.6 (“Number of Payphones Over Time”).
29
 Exec. Order No. 12,382, 47 Fed. Reg. 40,531 (1982).
30 Id. at § 2(a).
31 See 47 Fed. Reg. Doc. 82-1806 (1982) (FCC Notice treating, inter alia, approval of prototype plan 
for “Citizens Band Radio Service Plan for the Support of Local Government During Emergencies.”
32
 Exec. Order No. 13,010, 61 Fed. Reg. 37,347 (1996) (establishing the President’s Commission on 
Critical Infrastructure Protection).
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necessary for national defense, the executive order also recognizes that it constitutes a crucial 
component of our civilian economy. 
The “public safety and non-commercial uses of wireless capabilities have continued to 
grow. Public safety entities have attempted to improve their communications infrastructure to 
meet, among other needs, homeland security requirements and to respond to national or local 
emergencies.”33 Furthermore, “[w]ireless phones have gained new prominence as a result of the 
critical role they played in reestablishing communications on September 11, 2001, and have 
moved to the forefront of national emergency planning, national security, and priority access 
regimes.”34 The events of 9-11 also have reminded private businesses as well as families of the 
benefits of wireless communication in dealing with crisis situations.
B. The Homeland Security Act and Department of Homeland Security
Some 14 months after the devastating attacks against New York and Washington, 
Congress passed the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (“HSA” ).35 The HSA established the 
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”).36 “The primary mission of the Department includes 
reducing the vulnerability of the United States to terrorism, reducing damage that terrorist acts 
might cause, and coordinating efforts to deal with natural and manmade crises. At the same time, 
it should work to ensure that overall economic security is not diminished.37
33
 Richard E. Wiley & Rosemary C. Harold, Communications Law 2003: Changes and Challenges,  
316 (773 PLI/Pat 275).
34
  Phillips & Friedrich, supra note 24, 12.
35
 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub.L. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 5, 6, 18, 44 & 49 U.S.C.A.).
36
 6 U.S.C. § 111(a). For a detailed analysis and critique of the functions of DHS, see Jonathan 
Thessin, Department of Homeland Security, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 513 (2003).
37
 6 U.S.C. § 111(b) Mission
(1) In general
The primary mission of the Department is to--
(A) prevent terrorist attacks within the United States;
(B) reduce the vulnerability of the United States to terrorism;
Eagle, Wireless Telecommunications, Infrastructure Security, and the NIMBY Problem
Draft of 9/3/2004 Please do not cite or quote without permission.
8
Among the functions assigned the DHS Office of Science and Technology is “[t]o carry 
out research, development, testing, evaluation, and cost-benefit analyses in fields that would 
improve the safety, effectiveness, and efficiency of law enforcement technologies used by 
Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies, including, but not limited to-- *** wire and 
wireless interoperable communication technologies.38
A part of Title II of the HSA, known as the “Critical Infrastructure Information Act of 
2002,”39 provides for the protection of voluntarily submitted information concerning critical 
infrastructure.40 The term “critical infrastructure information,” is defined as “information not 
customarily in the public domain and related to the security of critical infrastructure or protected 
systems” that relates to actual or potential threats, weaknesses, or operational problems.41
Threats to critical infrastructure or protected systems includes “the misuse of or unauthorized 
access to all types of communications and data transmission systems.”42 Likewise, “protected 
systems” include a “communications network . . . or “data in transmission.43 Such voluntarily 
(C) minimize the damage, and assist in the recovery, from terrorist attacks that do occur within the 
United States;
(D) carry out all functions of entities transferred to the Department, including by acting as a focal 
point regarding natural and manmade crises and emergency planning;
(E) ensure that the functions of the agencies and subdivisions within the Department that are not 
related directly to securing the homeland are not diminished or neglected except by a specific 
explicit Act of Congress;
(F) ensure that the overall economic security of the United States is not diminished by efforts, 
activities, and programs aimed at securing the homeland; and
(G) monitor connections between illegal drug trafficking and terrorism, coordinate efforts to sever 
such connections, and otherwise contribute to efforts to interdict illegal drug trafficking.
38
 6 U.S.C. § 162(b)(6)(E).
39
 Pub. L. 107-296, Title II, Subtitle B (§§ 211 to 215), Nov. 25, 2002, 116 Stat. 2150). See 6 U.S.C. § 
101 (Note).
40
 6 U.S.C § 131, Homeland Security Act of 2002, § 214.
41
 6 U.S.C. § 131(3).
42 Id. at § 131(3)(A).
43 Id. at § 131(6)(B).
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shared information is exempted from Freedom of Information Act disclosure,44 and, inter alia, 
from direct use by federal or state agencies in civil actions.45
The HSA was partly built upon earlier links between national preparedness and 
telecommunications. In 1984, President Ronald Reagan issued Executive Order 12472,46
establishing a National Communications System (“NCS”). The NCS was charged, inter alia, with 
responsiveness to “the national security and emergency preparedness needs of the President and 
the Federal departments, agencies and other entities, including telecommunications in support of 
national security leadership and continuity of government.”47 Also, the NCS would work to 
ensure that the system was “capable of satisfying priority telecommunications requirements 
under all circumstances through use of commercial, government and privately owned 
telecommunications resources.”48 The FCC has promulgated regulations creating the 
Telecommunications Service Priority System.49
For national security as well as for commercial purposes, wireless telephony, data 
transmission, and the cyberinfrastructure are inextricably linked. Networked computers store and 
move vast amounts of financial and other business data and transactions. “The National Research 
Council noted more than a decade ago that ‘[t]hey control power delivery, communications, 
aviation, and financial services. They are used to store vital information, from medical records to
business plans to criminal records.’”50 Wireless communications services play an important and 
44 Id. at § 133(a)(1)(A) (referring to FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552).
45 Id. at § 133(a)(1)(C).
46
 Exec Order No. 12472, 49 Fed. Reg. 13,471 (1984).
47 Id. § 1(c)(1).
48 Id. § 1(c)(2).
49
 See, e.g., Priority Access Service (PAS) for National Security and Emergency Preparedness 
(NSEP), 47 C.F.R. Pt. 64, App. B.
50
 Emily Frye, The Tragedy of the Cybercommons: Overcoming Fundamental Vulnerabilities to 
Critical Infrastructures in a Networked World, 58 BUS. LAW. 349, 350 (2002) (quoting NAT’L RESEARCH 
COUNCIL, COMPUTERS AT RISK: SAFE COMPUTING IN THE INFORMATION AGE 7 (1991).
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growing role in data transmission. In a 2003 report, the FCC published the estimate of an 
industry analyst that “11.9 million, or 8 percent, of the 141.8 [million] mobile phone subscribers 
at the end of 2002 subscribed to some type of mobile Internet service.”51 Furthermore, “[a]n 
additional 2.3 million consumers subscribed to mobile Internet services on data-only mobile 
devices at the end of 2002.52
C. Homeland Security Activities of Wireless Telecommunications Industry
According to CITA, the wireless telecommunications industry trade association, industry 
efforts to support homeland security as of May 2004 included:
• Many of the major wireless carriers have developed a fleet of COW’s or Cell Sites on 
Wheels.  These systems are sent to areas in need to replace towers that may have been 
damaged or destroyed.  Other carriers have launched satellite versions of the smaller 
mobile sites - SatCOLTs - to help get networks back up and running after disasters.
These sites can be up and running in a matter of hours to ensure communications 
continue during and after emergency situations.
• Multiple wireless carriers are in the process of implementing a Priority Access program 
allowing government officials and first responders access to wireless networks in the 
event of an emergency.  Under this system, wireless carriers allocate a certain amount of 
capacity for priority users during emergencies. Priority service does not terminate calls in 
progress - rather, as callers hang up, the switch designates a portion of the newly vacated 
voice channels to authorized priority users, who must dial in a feature code.  Regardless 
of how high wireless usage surges, public safety officials will still be able to 
communicate in an emergency situation.
• The Washington, D.C. area will soon be home to the Capital Wireless Integrated 
Network, a secure and powerful wireless network allowing officials from more than 40 
51
 Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Annual 
Report and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions With Respect to Commercial Mobile Services, 
WT Docket No. 02-379, Eighth Report, FCC 03-150 (rel. Jul. 14, 2003), at  para. 17 (available at 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-03-150A1.pdf) (quoting Luiz Carvalho, et al., A 
Look at Wireless Data: Don’t Short SMS, Morgan Stanley, Equity Research – Wireless Telecom Services, 
Mar. 2, 2003 at 3).
52 Id. 
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local, state and federal agencies to communicate with each other using instant messaging 
on devices such as PCs, PDAs, and data-enabled mobile phones.53
IV. TOWER SITING AND THE NIMBY PROBLEM
A. Tragedy of the Commons and the Anticommons
Garrett Hardin,54 in his classic exposition of the “tragedy of the commons,” posited that 
everyone has a huge incentive to overexploit a common resource and fail to manage it prudently, 
since many others will do the same and will not be impressed by isolated examples of good 
stewardship.55 The tragedy of the anticommons, on the other hand, is that so many individuals 
and groups might have property rights that include veto power over a resource so that it would be 
impractical or impossible for the resource to be economically developed.56
A significant problem facing the United States is that we have a national commons, 
dubbed a “cybercommons,” that is comprised of data production, storage, and communications 
networks.57 While the internet is a substantial element of the cybercommons, internet traffic 
increasingly is being conducted through wireless telecommunications.58 The cybercommons has 
become an integral part of a much older commons–the common market that was one of the 
53
 CTIA Public Affairs Press Release, Homeland Security Supported by Wireless Initiatives, May 28, 
2004. Available at http://www.ctia.org/news_media/press/body.cfm?record_id=1408.
54
 Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
55 However, Hardin actually was referring to an “open access regime,” where no one claims ownership 
rights, rather than to a “commons,” which is the collective property of a defined group. See David D. 
Haddock & Lynne Kiesling, The Black Death and Property Rights, J. LEG. STUD. 545, 557 (2002). See 
also, Henry E. Smith, Semicommon Property Rights and Scattering in the Open Fields, 29 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 131 (2000) (describing complex pattern of private and common land uses in medieval fields). True
commons resources may be open access to group members, but are private property to outsiders. Shi-Ling 
Hsu, A Two-Dimensional Framework For Analyzing Property Rights Regimes, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
813, 817 n.12 (2003).
56 See, Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to 
Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998).
57 See Frey, supra note 50.
58 See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
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principal objects of the Framers when they created a nation of which places great emphasis on 
the protection of interstate commerce from the parochial concerns of individual states.59 To a 
certain extent, owners of intellectual property and specialized resources in cyberspace band 
together to establish and police their own common areas within the overall cybercommons as is
practical.60
In protecting the cybercommons and wireless telecommunications we face a collective 
problem. The costs of organizing and coordinating large numbers of individuals and 
organizations is great. Typically, the amount at stake for any single member is so small as to 
make organization utterly impractical. As the late Mancur Olson argued in his classic The Logic 
of Collective Action:61
 [U]nless the number of individuals is quite small, or unless there is coercion or some 
other special device to make individuals act in their common interest, rational, self-
interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interests.62
While the majority of adult Americans now enjoy the benefits of wireless 
communications, that benefit is so diffused that it is difficult to entice individuals to expend time 
and resources to defend it. On the other hand, the seamless web of wireless communications is 
vulnerable to more parochial concerns. Wireless towers must grow in number and must be 
located in individual polities, often small and homogeneous suburban municipalities, that are in a
practical position to block or hinder the national telecommunications network.
If we want to prevent a “tragedy of the cybercommons”63 resulting from national security 
threats such as terrorism, we will require intervention by the HAS, other federal agencies, and 
59
 QQ Need cite.
60 Id. at 361-362 (describing private-sector efforts to protect cyberinfrastructure). See also Carol Rose, 
The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emission Trades and Ecosystems, 83 
MINN. L. REV. 129, 155 (1998).
61MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965).
62Id. at 2 (emphasis in original).
63 See Frey, supra note 50.
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collaborating state and local law enforcement units. In addition, however, the nurturing of a 
robust and growing telecommunications network protecting the economy as well as national 
security requires that anticommons claims be held in check. This necessitates the development of
governmental policies that do not unduly hinder private efforts to develop robust 
communications networks.
B. The NIMBY Problem
The NIMBY (“not in my back yard”) syndrome reflects the fact that owner-occupied 
housing is the most valuable asset that the vast majority of people ever will own and their 
rational belief that deterioration in the neighborhood will affect its value.64 This accounts for 
homeowners exquisite interest in neighborhood change. According to Professor William Fischel, 
a Dartmouth land use economist and sometimes public servant:
NIMBYs show up at the zoning and planning board reviews, to which almost all 
developers of more-than-minor subdivisions must submit. If NIMBYs fail to reduce the 
scale and density of the project at these reviews, they often deploy alternative regulatory 
rationales, such as environmental impact statements, historic districts, aboriginal burial 
sites, agricultural preservation, wetlands, flood plains, access for the disabled and 
protection of (often unidentified) endangered species at other local, state and federal 
government forums, including courts of law. I have heard all of these arguments, and 
others too elaborately bizarre to list, in my ten years as a member of the Hanover, New 
Hampshire zoning board. And if NIMBYs fail in these efforts, they seek, often by direct 
democratic initiatives, to have the local zoning and planning regulations changed to make 
sure that similar developments do not happen again.65
NIMBYism also affects individuals’ reactions to wireless towers.66 The following 
anecdote is but one example:
Henry county commissioners are working on plans to strengthen the county’s ordinance 
governing sites for [wireless communications] towers.
64
 See William A. Fischel, Voting, Risk Aversion, and the NIMBY Syndrome: A Comment on Robert 
Nelson’s “Privatizing the Neighborhood,”7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 881, 881 (1999).
65 Id at 881-882.
66 See Malcolm J. Tuesley, Note, Not in My Backyard: The siting of Wireless Communications 
Facilities, 51 FED. COMM. L.J. 887, 897 (1999).
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“By and large, the towers are ugly, and people don’t want them in their back yards,” said
Commissioner Brian Williams. “If folks would stay off their cell phones there would be
no need for the towers,” the commissioner said before he ended an interview using his
cell phone.67
The following excerpt from a 1998 Fourth Circuit case involving the attempt by a church 
to lease some of its property for wireless towers gives some flavor of the circumstances that 
often underlie a permit denial:
Virginia Beach’s Zoning Ordinance required the Church to secure a conditional use 
permit to allow AT & T and PrimeCo to build their towers. Accordingly, the Church filed 
an application with the City Planning Department, which, after making some 
modifications to appellees’ proposal, recommended approval to the City Planning 
Commission. The Planning Commission then held a public hearing on January 8, 1997. 
Representatives of the companies and of the Church advocated approving the application, 
as did some commissioners and city officials, but numerous area residents spoke against 
approval, largely on the grounds that such a commercial use of the Church property was 
improper in a residential area and that the towers, even with various aesthetic 
modifications made by the companies, would be eyesores. One resident submitted a 
petition in opposition, with ninety signatures that he had collected in the day and a half 
prior to the hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Planning Commission voted 
unanimously, with one abstention, to recommend that the City Council approve the 
application.
The City Council considered the application at its meeting on March 25, 1997. Having 
been provided with copies of the Planning Department’s report, the transcript of the 
Planning Commission hearing, and the various application materials, the City Council 
also heard further testimony on the matter. Again, representatives of the companies and 
of the Church explained and supported the application; numerous area residents spoke, all 
of those not affiliated with the Church being opposed. One resident, Mr. Wayne Shank, 
presented petitions with over seven hundred signatures in opposition. The Council also 
appears to have had before it one shorter petition supporting the application and various 
letters to councilmen on the matter, both in support and in opposition. The only 
councilman to speak on the merits, Councilman William Harrison (who represents Little 
Neck), voiced his opposition in light of the testimony of area residents who did not think 
that improved service was worth the burden of having the towers looming over them.
67
 Peter Scott, Communication Towers Follow the Growth, ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, 
December 28, 2000, J15.
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The Council ultimately voted unanimously to deny the application . . . .68
From the industry’s point of view, NIMBYism presents a vexing addition to an elaborate 
regulatory process: 
Imagine that you own a business in a service industry. Before you can operate this 
business, the federal government requires that you purchase an expensive license 
allowing you to conduct your business within a specific geographic area. In addition, 
before you can expand your infrastructure to improve and expand your services, you must 
receive approval from the local zoning board. When you apply to the local zoning board 
for a conditional use permit to site your new infrastructure, and you satisfy all of the 
board’s requirements, they deny your application; local citizens groups have pressured 
this board to implement a moratorium against the expansion of businesses of your type.
The basis for this moratorium is steeped in myth and unfounded community hysteria that 
your infrastructure causes cancer and birth defects, deflates adjacent property values, and 
the prevailing attitude that your business has already expanded enough within city limits. 
The board even hears testimony from an environmental group arguing that your industry 
regulations were written by a former Nazi thus making them illegal. This hypothetical 
scenario may sound far-fetched, but it occurs on a daily basis in the wireless 
telecommunications industry.69
C. The Need for Congressional Action
In 1995, the U.S. House of Representatives passed H.R. 1555, the “Communications Act 
of 1995.” The bill was designed to decrease the price and encourage the development of new 
telecommunications technologies through deregulation.70 Section 107, would amend the 
Communications Act of 193471 by adding a provision on “Facilities Siting Policies.”72 The 
68
 AT & T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. City Council of Virginia Beach  155 F.3d 423, 425 (4th Cir. 1998).
69
 David W. Hughes, When NIMBYs Attack: The Heights to Which Communities Will Climb to Prevent 
the Siting of Wireless Towers, 23 J. CORP. L. 469, 470 (1998).
70
 H.R. 1555, 104th Cong. (1995).
71
 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-614.
72
 Sec. 107. Facilities Siting; Radio Frequency Emission Standards.
(a) NATIONAL WIRELESS TELECOMMUNICATIONS SITING POLICY- Section 332(c) of the 
Act (47 U.S.C. 332(c)) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
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House’s intent was to provide federal standards for wireless communications tower siting, with 
some local input. In reporting out H.R. 1555, the Commerce Committee discussed why it 
believed such action necessary:
(7) Facilities Siting Policies- (A) Within 180 days after enactment of this paragraph, the Commission 
shall prescribe and make effective a policy regarding State and local regulation of the placement, 
construction, modification, or operation of facilities for the provision of commercial mobile services.
(B) Pursuant to subchapter III of chapter 5, title 5, United States Code, the Commission shall establish 
a negotiated rulemaking committee to negotiate and develop a proposed policy to comply with the 
requirements of this paragraph. Such committee shall include representatives from State and local 
gov ernments, affected industries, and public safety agencies. In negotiating and developing such a 
policy, the committee shall take into account–
(i) the desirability of enhancing the coverage and quality of commercial mobile services and 
fostering competition in the provision of such services;
(ii) the legitimate interests of State and local governments in matters of exclusively local concern;
(iii) the effect of State and local regulation of facilities siting on interstate commerce; and
(iv) the administrative costs to State and local governments of reviewing requests for authorization to 
locate facilities for the provision of commercial mobile services.
(C) The policy prescribed pursuant to this paragraph shall ensure that–
(i) regulation of the placement, construction, and modification of facilities for the provision of 
commercial mobile services by any State or local government or instrumentality thereof–
(I) is reasonable, nondiscriminatory, and limited to the minimum necessary to accomplish the State 
or local government’s legitimate purposes; and
(II) does not prohibit or have the effect of precluding any commercial mobile service; and
(ii) a State or local government or instrumentality thereof shall act on any request for authorization to 
locate, construct, modify, or operate facilities for the provision of commercial mobile services within 
a reasonable period of time after the request is fully filed with such government or instrumentality; 
and
(iii) any decision by a State or local government or instrumentality thereof to deny a request for 
authorization to locate, construct, modify, or operate facilities for the provision of commercial 
mobile services shall be in writing and shall be supported by substantial evidence contained in a 
written record.
(D) The policy prescribed pursuant to this paragraph shall provide that no State or local government or 
any instrumentality thereof may regulate the placement, construction, modification, or operation of 
such facilities on the basis of the environmental effects of radio frequency emissions, to the extent that 
such facilities comply with the Commission’s regulations concerning such emissions.
(E) In accordance with subchapter III of chapter 5, title 5, United States Code, the Commission shall 
periodically establish a negotiated rulemaking committee to review the policy prescribed by the 
Commission under this paragraph and to recommend revisions to such policy.’. 
[Subsections (b) Radio Frequency Emissions and (c) Availability of [Federal] Property are omitted.]
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The Committee finds that current State and local requirements, siting and zoning 
decisions by non-federal units of government, have created an inconsistent and, at times, 
conflicting patchwork of requirements which will inhibit the deployment of Personal 
Communications Services (PCS) as well as the rebuilding of a digital technology-based 
cellular telecommunications network. The Committee believes it is in the national interest 
that uniform, consistent requirements, with adequate safeguards of the public health and 
safety, be established as soon as possible.  Such requirements will ensure an appropriate 
balance in policy and will speed deployment and the availability of competitive wireless 
telecommunications services which ultimately will provide consumers with lower costs 
as well as with a greater range and options for such services.73
Notable among the House “Facilities Siting Policies” provisions were the establishment 
of a rulemaking committee that would develop policy and that would comprise the major 
interested groups, state and local officials, public safety agencies, and representatives from 
“affected industries,” which, presumably, would include user groups as well as 
telecommunications providers.74 This group would explicitly take into account, on the one hand, 
the enhancement of wireless services and competition among providers,75 and the effects of local 
regulation of siting on interstate commerce.76 On the other hand, it would take into account “the 
legitimate interests of State and local governments in matters of exclusively local concern,”77 as 
well as the administrative costs incurred by municipalities in processing facility location 
requests.78 The objects of the policy to be developed would ensure, inter alia, that local and state 
regulation of “the placement, construction, and modification of facilities” “is reasonable, 
73 H.R. REP. NO. 104-104(I), at  94 (1995) 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10, 1995 WL 442504 (July 24, 1995).
74
 H.R. 1551 at § 107(a)(7)(B).
75 Id. at § 107(a)(7)(B)(i).
76 Id. at § 107(a)(7)(B)(iii).
77 Id. at § 107(a)(7)(B)(ii).
78 Id. at § 107(a)(7)(B)(iv).
Eagle, Wireless Telecommunications, Infrastructure Security, and the NIMBY Problem
Draft of 9/3/2004 Please do not cite or quote without permission.
18
nondiscriminatory, and limited to the minimum necessary to accomplish the State or local 
government’s legitimate purposes.”79
H.R. 1555 also included a provision that the federal government make federal property, 
including rights of way and easements, available for wireless telecommunications facility siting 
to the greatest extent possible.80 Finally, it provided that, on the basis of this deliberative process, 
and within 180 days after the siting policies were enacted,  the FCC “shall prescribe and make 
effective a policy regarding State and local regulation of the placement, construction, 
modification, or operation of facilities for the provision of commercial mobile services.”81
The House Commerce Committee was not unaware of the concerns that local officials 
had about federal intervention in land use regulation pertaining to towers. It declared:
The Committee recognizes that there are legitimate State and local concerns involved in 
regulating the siting of such facilities and believes the negotiated rulemaking committee 
should address those matters, such as aesthetic values and the costs associated with the 
use and maintenance of public rights-of-way. The intent of the Committee is that 
requirements resulting from the negotiated rulemaking committee’s work and subsequent 
Commission rulemaking will allow construction of a CMRS network at a lower cost for 
siting and construction compatible with legitimate public health, safety and property 
protections while fully addressing the legitimate concerns of all affected parties and 
providing certainty for planning and building.82
The siting provisions of H.R. 1555 had considerable opposition in the House itself. 
Representative James Moran, whose proffered amendment was not permitted to come to a vote,83
declared that there was
a real sleeper in this bill, and that is with regard to the siting of these control towers. 
There are about 20,000 of them around the country now. There are going to be about 
79 Id. at § 107(a)(7)(C)(i) and (C)(i)(I).
80 Id. at § 107(c).
81 Id. at § 107(a)(7)(A).
82
 H.R. Rep. 104-204(I), at 94-95, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10, 1995 WL 442504 (July 24, 1995).
83 See 141 Cong. Rec. H8269-02, *H8272 (noting a 6-5 vote in the Rules Committee).
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100,000. Our amendment said on private property, if you try to site a commercial tower, 
then the people that own that property have a right to go to their local zoning board.
Of course they have the right. Imagine if somebody tries to put a 150 foot tower on your 
property, and you object, and they tell you, “Well, the Congress gave us the authority to 
put it on. It is a Federal law. It supersedes local zoning authority.” That is the last thing 
we want to be doing.84
The Senate bill corresponding to H.R. 1555 had no provision respecting 
telecommunications siting. The House-Senate conference produced the subsequently enacted 
version of the TCA. This version did contain a siting facilities provision, but it was considerable 
different from that adopted by the House.
The conference agreement creates a new section 704 which prevents Commission 
preemption of local and State land use decisions and preserves the authority of State and 
local governments over zoning and land use matters except in the limited circumstances 
set forth in the conference agreement..85
V. THE TCA SITING POLICY ATTEMPTS A BALANCE OF RIGHTS
A. The T elecommunications Act of 1996
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 (TCA)86 has been described by the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit as “an omnibus overhaul of the federal regulation of 
communications companies, intended to provide for a pro-competitive, deregulatory national 
policy framework designed to accelerate rapidly private sector deployment of advanced 
telecommunications and information technologies and services . . . by opening all 
telecommunications markets to competition . . . .”87
84
 141 Cong. Rec. H8269-02, *H8275 (Aug. 2, 1995).
85
 H.R. CONF. REP. 104-458, 207-208 (1996).
86
 Pub. L. 104-104, Feb. 8, 1996, 110 Stat. 56 (codified in scattered provisions of 47 U.S.C.).
87
 Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. Craig Willoth, 176 F.3d 630, 637 (2nd Cir. 1999)
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The Siting Policy of the TCA is styled “Preservation of local zoning authority.”88 State 
and local authority pertaining to “decisions regarding the placement, construction, and 
88 (a) NATIONAL WIRELESS TELECOMMUNICATIONS SITING POLICY.--Section 332(c) (47 
U.S.C. 332(c)) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
(7) Preservation of local zoning authority
(A) General authority
Except as provided in this paragraph, nothing in this chapter shall limit or affect the authority of a 
State or local government or instrumentality thereof over decisions regarding the placement, 
construction, and modification of personal wireless service facilities.
(B) Limitations
(i) The regulation of the placement, construction, and modification of personal wireless service 
facilities by any State or local government or instrumentality thereof--
  (I) shall not unreasonably discriminate among providers of functionally equivalent services; and
  (II) shall not prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the provision of personal wireless services.
(ii) A State or local government or instrumentality thereof shall act on any request for authorization 
to place, construct, or modify personal wireless service facilities within a reasonable period of time 
after the request is duly filed with such government or instrumentality, taking into account the nature 
and scope of such request.
(iii) Any decision by a State or local government or instrumentality thereof to deny a request to 
place, construct, or modify personal wireless service facilities shall be in writing and supported by 
substantial evidence contained in a written record.
(iv) No State or local government or instrumentality thereof may regulate the placement, 
construction, and modification of personal wireless service facilities on the basis of the 
environmental effects of radio frequency emissions to the extent that such facilities comply with the 
Commission’s regulations concerning such emissions.
(v) Any person adversely affected by any final action or failure to act by a State or local government 
or any instrumentality thereof that is inconsistent with this subparagraph may, within 30 days after 
such action or failure to act, commence an action in any court of competent jurisdiction. The court 
shall hear and decide such action on an expedited basis. Any person adversely affected by an act or 
failure to act by a State or local government or any instrumentality thereof that is inconsistent with 
clause (iv) may petition the Commission for relief.
(C) Definitions
For purposes of this paragraph--
(i) the term “personal wireless services” means commercial mobile services, unlicensed wireless 
services, and common carrier wireless exchange access
services;
(ii) the term “personal wireless service facilities” means facilities for the provision of personal 
wireless services; and
(iii) the term “unlicensed wireless service” means the offering of telecommunications services using 
duly authorized devices which do not require individual licenses, but does not mean the provision of 
direct-to-home satellite services (as defined in section 303(v) of this title).
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modification of personal wireless service facilities” are limited or affected only by the specific 
limitations contained in the siting paragraph.89 Beyond those limitations, nothing in the 
Communications Act would limit or affect the authority of a State or local government or 
instrumentality thereof over decisions regarding the “placement, construction, and modification 
of personal wireless service facilities,” “except as provided in this [siting] paragraph.”90
While the House version would have cabined local discretion within negotiated policies 
established by the FCC, the Conference Committee attempted to temper such discretion 
primarily through the imposition of procedure. This is not to say that Section 704 retains none of 
the bite of the FCC siting rules envisioned in the House version. “The TCA ‘effects substantive 
changes to the local zoning process ... by preempting any local regulations, including zoning 
regulations, which conflict with its provisions.’”91 Accordingly, local zoning measures are 
permissible only to the extent they do not interfere with the TCA.92 The particular statutory 
language provides that, although the TCA preserves local zoning authority in all other respects 
over the siting of wireless facilities, “the method by which siting decisions are made is now 
subject to judicial oversight.”93 Specifically, according to the language of the TCA, a denial of a
request to build wireless facilities must be “in writing and supported by substantial evidence 
contained in a written record.”94
That said, preemptive exceptions to a contrary default rule do not augur for smooth 
implementation. The result of legislation that embodies “seemingly mutually exclusive 
89
 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7).
90 Id. at § 332(c)(7)(A).
91
 SBA Communications, Inc. v. Zoning Comm’n of Town of Brookfield, 112 F.Supp.2d 233 
(D.Conn. 2000) (quoting Sprint Spectrum L.P. v. Town of Easton, 982 F.Supp. 47, 50 (D. Mass. 1997)).
92
 Sprint Spectrum L.P. v. Town of Easton, 982 F.Supp. 47, 50 (D. Mass. 1997).
93
 Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. Craig Willoth, 176 F.3d 630, 637 (2nd Cir. 1999) (citing § 332(c)(7)(A) of 
the Communications Act as revised by the TCA).
94 Id. (citing § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii)). 
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propositions”95 might better be described as a lack of clarity masquerading as simplicity. As the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has noted, the Siting Policy “fairly bristles with 
potential issues, from the proper allocation of the burden of proof through the available remedies 
for violation of the statute’s requirements.”96
Courts interpreting the Siting Policy have been cognizant of the need to balance its
conflicting goals. Section 704 “works like a scale that . . . attempts to balance to two objects of 
competing weight: on the one arm sits the need to accelerate the deployment of 
telecommunications technology, while on the other arm rests the desire to preserve state and 
local control over land use matters.”97 Similarly, it is “a deliberate compromise between two 
competing aims–to facilitate nationally the growth of wireless telephone service and to maintain 
substantial local control over siting of towers.”98
Putting it another way, in adopting the Siting Policy, Congress attempted to have the 
federal vs. local regulatory conundrum decided both ways. Congressman Thomas Bliley, 
chairman of the Commerce Committee at the time of the TCA’s enactment, explained:
Nothing is in this bill that prevents a locality . . . from determining where a cellular pole 
should be located, but we do want to make sure that this technology is available across 
the country, that we do not allow a community to say we are not going to have any 
cellular pole in our locality. That is wrong. Nor are we going to say they can delay these 
people forever. But the location will be determined by the local governing body.99
95 Kevin M. O’Neill, Note, Wireless Facilities are a Towering Problem: How can Local Zoning 
Boards Make the Call Without Violating Section 704 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996?, 40 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 975, 984 (1999).
96
 Cellular Telephone Co. v. Town of Oyster Bay, 166 F.3d 490, 492 (2nd Cir. 1999).
97
 ATC Realty, LLC v. Town of Kingston, 303 F.3d 91, 94 (1st Cir. 2002).
98
 Town of Amherst v. Omnipoint Communications Enters., Inc., 173 F.3d 9, 13 (1st Cir. 1999).
99
 141 Cong. Rec. H8274 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1995) (statement of Rep. Bliley).
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B. Specific Siting Policy Provisions
Since Section 704 operate not through affirmative federal rules, but rather through 
oversight of the operation of state and local land use decisions, their real significance must be 
gleaned from an examination of judicial review of specific provisions.
1. Burden of Proof.
Given that so many of the reasons why a tower application might be denied are 
subjective, or at least not easily quantifiable, establishing which party has the burden of proof is 
important in the determination. The Siting Policy contains no provision explicitly assigning the 
burden.
Courts are divided as to whether Section 704 shifts the burden of proof to the government 
agency that denied the applicant’s siting request. In Omnipoint Communications Enterprises, Inc. 
v. Town of Amherst,100 the court held that, once the carrier has come forward with minimal 
information in support of its application, the Siting Policy “places the burden of proof to support 
any denial on the local government entity issuing the denial.”101 Other courts have agreed.102
In Sprint Spectrum L.P. v. Town of Easton,103 the court explained that the burden is on the
government “rather than burdening the applicant with producing substantial evidence supporting 
its approval.”104 Easton added that “because the TCA ‘effectively preempts state law in several 
100
 74 F.Supp.2d 109 (D.N.H.1998).
101 Id. at 122.
102 See, e.g ., Smart SMR of N.Y., Inc. v. Zoning Comm’n, 995 F.Supp. 52, 56 (D. Conn. 1998); Cellco 
Partnership v. Town Plan & Zoning Comm’n, 3 F.Supp.2d 178, 182 (D. Conn. 1998); PrimeCo Personal 
Communications L.P. v. Village of Fox Lake, 26 F.Supp.2d 1052, 1064 (N.D. Ill. 1998); Laurence Wolf 
Capital Management Trust v. City of Ferndale, 128 F.Supp.2d 441 (E.D.Mich. 2000), aff’d in part, rev’d 
in part, 61 Fed.Appx. 204 (6th Cir. 2003).
103
 982 F.Supp. 47 (D. Mass. 1997).
104 Id. at 49 (citing United States Cellular Corp. v. Board of Adjustment of City of Des Moines, Polk 
County District Court, LACL No. CL 00070195 (Iowa Dist. Ct. for Polk County Jan. 2, 1997)).
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respects, including the burden of proof, . . . it is the Board’s burden to produce substantial 
evidence supporting its denial of plaintiff’s application.’”105
Other courts have held that the burden is on the applicant. The reasoning in Easton, for 
instance, was attacked by a U.S. District Court in Michigan in New Par v. City of Saginaw:106
This Court is not persuaded by [Easton’s] reasoning, nor can it find any justification for a 
burden-shifting requirement in the plain language of the Act, especially in light of the 
provision stating that “nothing in this chapter shall limit or affect the authority of a State 
or local government or instrumentality thereof over decisions regarding the placement, 
construction, and modification of personal wireless service facilities.”107
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, ruled similarly in Southwestern Bell 
Mobile System, Inc. v. Todd,108 where it said that there was nothing in the Act that would 
“support placing a burden upon the Board.”109 Other courts have concurred.110
2. Discrimination Among Providers
Section 704’s requirement that localities “shall not unreasonably discriminate among 
providers of functionally equivalent services”111 prohibits digital wireless communications 
service permit denials on the basis that satisfactory analogue service is already in place. In AT & 
105 Id. at 52 (quoting United States Cellular Corp., at 5).
106
 161 F.Supp.2d 759 (E.D.Mich. 2001).
107 Id. at 768 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(A)).
108
 244 F.3d 51 (1st Cir. 2001).
109 Id. at 63. 
110 See, e.g., MetroPCS, Inc. v. City of San Francisco, 259 F.Supp.2d 1004 (N.D.Cal. 2003) (applicant 
had burden of proof to show that city planning commission’s denial of conditional use permit to allow 
mounting of antennas on parking garage roof was not based upon the substantial evidence on the record). 
See also, VoiceStream Minneapolis, Inc. v. St. Croix County, 342 F.3d 818, 830-831 (7th Cir. 2003); 
American Tower LP v. City of Huntsville, 295 F.3d 1203, 1207 (11th Cir.2002).
111
 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II).
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T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. City Council of City of Virginia Beach,112 the District Court found the 
anti-discrimination requirement violated when the only basis in the record for the denial was one 
councilman’s assertion that local residents were satisfied with their current analog service and 
did not wish for, or felt they needed, digital service.113
3. Prohibition of Wireless Services
The heart of the House-Senate compromise, embodied in Section 704, is that states and
localities can regulate the placement of wireless towers, but cannot prohibit them.114 This 
requirement is explicit,115 but the courts have split on its meaning. The Fourth Circuit 
consistently has taken the position that “a telecommunications provider could not prevail in a 
challenge to an individual zoning decision absent a general ban or policy to reject all 
applications.”116 Furthermore “[t]he burden for the carrier invoking this provision is a heavy one: 
to show from language or circumstances not just that this application has been rejected, but that 
further reasonable efforts are so likely to be fruitless that it is a waste of time to try.”117 Other 
courts have agreed .118
112
 979 F.Supp. 416 (E.D. Va. 1997), aff’d in part, reversed in part, 155 F.3d 423 (4th Cir. 1998).
113 Id. at 425.
114 See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 99 (statement of Congressman Thomas Bliley).
115
 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II) (stating that state and local siting regulations “shall not prohibit or 
have the effect of prohibiting the provision of personal wireless services”).
116
 USCOC of Virginia RSA #3, Inc. v. Montgomery County Bd. of Supervisors, 343 F.3d 262, 268 
(4th Cir. 2003) (citing AT&T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. City Council of Virginia Beach, 155 F.3d 423, 428 
(4th Cir. 1998)).
117 Id. (quoting 360° Communications Co. of Charlottesville v. Board of Supervisors of Albemarle 
County, 211 F.3d 79, 88 (4th Cir. 2000)).
118
 See, e.g., Cellco Partnership v. Town Plan and Zoning Comm’n of the Town of Farmington, 3 
F.Supp.2d 178, 184-85 (D.Conn. 1998); AT&T Wireless Services of Fla., Inc. v. Orange County, 982 
F.Supp. 856, 860 (M.D. Fla.1997).
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The First Circuit’s approach, announced in Town of Amherst v. Omnipoint 
Communications Enterprises, Inc. ,119 disparaged the town’s assertion that the Act prohibited 
only “‘general’ bans.”120 “If the criteria [for permit approvals] or their administration effectively 
preclude towers no matter what the carrier does, they may amount to a ban ‘in effect’ even 
though substantial evidence will almost certainly exist for the denial.”121
The Second Circuit propounded an “effects” test, in Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. Willoth,122
that stressed whether governmental acts constituted a refusal to permit service in a particular part 
of the municipality.123
[T]he plain focus of the statute is on whether it is possible for a user in a given remote 
location to reach a facility that can establish connections to the national telephone 
network. … In other words, local governments must allow service providers to fill gaps 
in the ability of wireless telephones to have access to land-lines. *** A local government 
may reject an application for construction of a wireless service facility in an under-served 
area without thereby prohibiting personal wireless services if the service gap can be 
closed by less intrusive means…. 124
However, Willoth added that holes in coverage that are “very limited in number or size” are 
treated as de minimis.125
While the foregoing seemed sufficient to establish the contours of “gap” in terms of
physical space, the Siting Policy is concerned with gaps in wireless service. Courts are split on 
119
 173 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 1999).
120 Id. at 14.
121 Id.
122
 176 F.3d 630 (2nd Cir. 1999).
123
 See Town of Amherst v. Omnipoint Communications Enters., Inc., 173 F.3d 9, 14 (1st Cir. 1999); 
Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. Willoth, 176 F.3d 630, 642-643 (2nd Cir. 1999); APT Pittsburgh L.P. v. Penn 
Pp., 196 F.3d 469, 478-479 (3rd Cir. 1999).
124
 Sprint Spectrum L.P. v. Willoth  176 F.3d 630, 643 (2nd Cir. 1999).
125 Id. at 643-644 (giving as illustrations “the interiors of buildings in a sparsely populated rural area, 
or confined to a limited number of houses or spots as the area covered by buildings increases”).
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whether “gap,” in this context, means “gap in receiving service,” or “gap in providing 
service.”126 Some, including the Third Circuit, have examined the gap from the customer’s 
perspective.127 First Circuit has taken the provider’s perspective.128 Courts also are split on 
whether to take the perspective of the customer who otherwise would not be provided with a 
given technology.129
In VoiceStream Minneapolis, Inc. v. St. Croix County,130 the Seventh Circuit held that the 
applicant failed to meet its “heavy burden” of establishing that its proposal to build a 185-foot 
tower in scenic river district was the only feasible plan for closing a gap in its coverage.
Although several alternatives to the proposed site were suggested by the county, the applicant
did not thoroughly investigate the viability of the alternatives.131
This does not mean, however, that the potential availability of “alternative sites” which 
are neither actually available nor technically feasible will defeat an effective prohibition claim.
In Nextel Communications of Mid-Atlantic, Inc. v. Town of Sudbury,132 the court concluded that 
the town “was in fact unwilling” to issue permits for “the only other sites which would 
126 Independent Wireless One Corp. v. Town of Charlotte, 242 F.Supp.2d 409, 417-420 (D.Vt. 2003).
127
 Nextel W. Corp. v. Unity Twp., 282 F.3d 257, 265-266 (3rd Cir. 2002); SiteTech Group, Ltd. v. 
Bd. of Zoning Appeals of Town of Brookhaven, 140 F.Supp.2d 255, 259 (E.D.N.Y. 2001).
128
 Second Generation Properties, LP v. Town of Pelham, 313 F.3d 620 (1st Cir. 2002).
129
 Western PCS II Corp. v. Extraterritorial Zoning Authority, 957 F.Supp. 1230 (D.N.M. 1997) 
(holding denial of permit to only provider of digital technology in specified area to constitute a 
prohibition where customers otherwise limited to analog service only). Accord, Sprint Spectrum L.P. v. 
Jefferson County, 968 F.Supp. 1457, 1468 (N.D.Ala. 1997). Contra, Iowa Wireless Services, L.P. v. City 
of Miline, 29 F.Supp.2d 915, 923 (C.D.Ill. 1998).
130
 342 F.3d 818 (7th Cir. 2003).
131
 VoiceStream Minneapolis, Inc. v. St. Croix County  342 F.3d 818, *835 (C.A.7 (Wis.),2003)
132 No. Civ. A. 01-11754-DPW, 2003 WL 543383 (D. Mass. Feb. 26, 2003) (not reported in 
F.Supp.2d).
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conceivably have met Nextel’s coverage needs without requiring zoning relief.”133
Unwillingness or hostility have factored in other prohibition cases as well.134 The gravamen of 
these cases is ostensible cooperation masking prohibition. The First Circuit observed, in National
Tower, LLC v. Plainville Zoning Bd. of Appeals,135 that “[s]etting out criteria under the zoning 
law that no one could ever meet is an example of effective prohibition.”136
While localities may not regulate so as to prohibit wireless communications service, they 
have not affirmative duty to lease municipal property for wireless communications towers, even 
if there is no practical alternative site. Propriety refusals to lease do not constitute regulatory or 
zoning prohibitions.137
4. “Reasonable Period” for Consideration of Applications
The TCA provides that facilities siting requests must be acted upon “within a reasonable 
period of time after the request is duly filed with such government or instrumentality, taking into 
account the nature and scope of such request.”138
In Town of Amherst v. Omnipoint Communications Enterprises, Inc. ,139 the First Circuit 
chastised the locality that it must “face reality” and refrain from demanding and rejecting 
successive applications without enunciating a clear indication of its expectations.140 “While 
133 Id. at *13 (noting statements by local officials that “the Selectmen see no need or desire to issue 
any more [permits]”).
134 See, e.g., Omnipoint Holdings v. Town of Westford, 206 F.Supp.2d 166, 172 (D. Mass. 2002) 
(noting that “fixed hostility” of Board suggests that further applications would be futile).
135
 297 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 2002).
136 Id. at 23.
137
 Omnipoint Communications Enters., L.P. v. Township of Nether Providence, 232 F.Supp.2d 430 
(E.D. Pa. 2002).
138
 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(ii)
139
 173 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 1999).
140 Id. at 16-17.
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prepared to tolerate some delay, Congress made clear in two different provisions that it expected 
expeditious resolution both by the local authorities and by courts called upon to enforce the 
federal limitations.”141
5. Denials Shall be in Writing
The requirement of Section 704 that the denial of a permit request “shall be in writing”142
seems clear cut. Yet, even here there are complications. First, there is the problem of defining a 
permit “request.” In order to be entitled to the benefits of this provision, the applicant must have 
“supported its permit application with a ‘certain minimal amount of information.’”143
More fundamentally, in Southwestern Bell Mobile System v. Todd,144 the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit considered the scope of judicial review with reference to the 
required written denial. The opinion noted that some courts had required that the local authorities 
issue formal findings of fact and conclusions of law.145 On the other hand, some courts had found 
a written record of the meeting and a note that the application had been “denied” to suffice.146
141 Id. at 17 n.8 (citing to 47 U.S.C. §§ 332(c)(7)(B)(ii) and (B)(V), and to H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-
458, at 209 (1996).
142
 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii).
143
 SBA Communications, Inc. v. Zoning Comm’n of Town of Brookfield, 112 F.Supp.2d 233, 236 
(D.Conn. 2000) (quoting Omnipoint Communications Enter., Inc. v. Town of Amherst, 74 F.Supp.2d 109, 
122 (D.N.H. 1998).
144
 244 F.3d 51 (1st Cir. 2001). In an extensive analysis, the Sixth Circuit found Todd “persuasive.”
New Par v. City of Saginaw, 301 F.3d 390 (6th Cir. 2002).
145 Id. at 59 (citing, inter alia, Smart SMR of New York, Inc. v. The Zoning Commission of the Town 
of Stratford, 995 F.Supp. 52, 56 (D.Conn. 1998); AT&T Wireless Servs. of Florida, Inc. v. Orange 
County, 982 F.Supp. 856, 859 (M.D.Fla. 1997)).  
146 Id. (citing AT&T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. City Council of Virginia Beach, 155 F.3d 423, 429 (4th 
Cir.1998); AT&T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. Winston-Salem Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 172 F.3d 307, 312-13 
(4th Cir.1999).
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The First Circuit found that “[b]oth of these approaches seem flawed.”147 Todd held that the 
Siting Policy “merely requires a written decision, in contrast to the Administrative Procedures 
Act and other sections of the TCA that explicitly require formal findings of fact and conclusions 
of law.”148 Furthermore, “[p]assage of the TCA did not alter the reality that the local boards that 
administer the zoning laws are primarily staffed by laypeople. Though their decisions are now 
subject to review under the TCA, it is not realistic to expect highly detailed findings of fact and 
conclusions of law.”149 Yet issuance of a denial giving “no reasons for a decision” coupled with 
the written record might be confusing, especially when the record contains assertions that might 
be attributable to the board or only to individual members.150 “The TCA distinguishes between a 
written denial and a written record, thus indicating that the record cannot be a substitute for a 
separate denial.” 151
We conclude, therefore, that the TCA requires local boards to issue a written denial 
separate from the written record. That written denial must contain a sufficient explanation 
of the reasons for the permit denial to allow a reviewing court to evaluate the evidence in 
the record supporting those reasons. We stress, however, that a meaningful review of the 
decision is not limited, as Southwestern Bell would have it, only to the facts specifically 
offered in the written decision. Again, such a requirement would place an unjustified 
premium on the ability of a lay board to write a decision.152
Todd leaves open two important questions. The first is why the dual requirements for a 
written denial and a written record precludes their incorporation into a single document. What if 
the written denial contained no clear statement of reasons, but simply incorporated the written 
record that did contain a clear statement of reasons? Under these facts, a District Court within the 
147 Id. A noted regulatory takings lawyer has referred to such an analysis as “a Goldilocks and the 
Three Bears sort of critique.” Michael M. Berger, Recent Takings and Eminent Domain Cases, C930 
ALI-ABA 221, 230 (Aug. 17, 1994).
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Id. at 60.
151 Id. (citing 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii)).
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First Circuit held, in Nextel Communications of Mid-Atlantic, Inc. v. Town of Sudbury, that “[t]o 
reject the ZBA’s procedures on this ground would be a victory of form over substance.”153
6. “Supported by Substantial Evidence”
The most substantive aspect of the Siting Policy is the requirement that denials of permit 
requests shall be “supported by substantial evidence contained in a written record.”154 As the 
Eleventh Circuit noted in Preferred Sites, LLC v. Troup County,155 while Section 704 “does not 
statutorily define the term ‘substantial evidence,’” the House-Senate Conference Committee 
expressly noted that it is meant to be “‘the traditional standard used for judicial review of agency 
actions.’”156 But what standard is that?
“Judicial review of agency actions” most directly brings to mind actions of administrative 
agencies, hence administrative law. Applying the inference that Congress intends to use 
undefined terms of art in their established meaning,157 many courts have presumed that Congress 
intended “substantial evidence” to “track” the meaning of that term under the Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA).158 The APA requires review for “substantial evidence” in cases of 
adjudications and formal rulemaking by federal agencies.159 Under this approach, denials of 
siting requests are subject to judicial oversight at a higher level of scrutiny than standard local 
152 Id.
153
 No. Civ.A. 01-11754-DPW, 2003 WL 543383 (D. Mass. Feb. 26, 2003).
154
 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii).
155
 296 F.3d 1210, 1218 (11th Cir. 2002).
156 Id. at 1218 (quoting H.R. Conf. Rep. 104-458, at 208, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 124, at 223).
157 Preferred Sites, 296 F.3d at 1218 (citing McDermott Int’l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 342 
(1991) (so analyzing “seaman,” undefined in Jones Act).
158
 Voice Stream PCS I, LLC v. City of Hillsboro, 301 F.Supp.2d 1251, 1256 (D. Or. 2004).
159 See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 37 n.79 (D.C. Cir.1976).
Eagle, Wireless Telecommunications, Infrastructure Security, and the NIMBY Problem
Draft of 9/3/2004 Please do not cite or quote without permission.
32
zoning decisions in order to determine whether the denials were supported by substantial 
evidence.160
Traditionally, the federal courts have taken an extremely deferential stance in reviewing 
local zoning decisions, limiting the scope of inquiry to the constitutionality of the zoning 
decision under a standard of rational review. Although Congress explicitly preserved 
local zoning authority in all other respects over the siting of wireless facilities, the 
method by which siting decisions are made is now subject to judicial oversight. 
Therefore, denials subject to the TCA are reviewed by this court more closely than 
standard local zoning decisions. Here, the issue is whether the denials were supported by 
substantial evidence. * * * “Substantial evidence” means less than a preponderance, but 
more than a mere scintilla of evidence. “It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable 
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”161
Among the U.S. Courts of Appeals adopting an APA analysis are those for the First,162
Second,163 Third,164 and Sixth165 Circuits. Also employing this standard, the Eleventh Circuit 
noted in Preferred Sites, LLC v. Troup County166 that “[s]ubstantial evidence is more than a mere 
scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 
support a conclusion.”167 Furthermore, “[a]lthough the ‘substantial evidence’ standard is not as 
stringent as the preponderance of the evidence standard, it requires courts to take a harder look 
160
 SBA Communications, Inc. v. Zoning Comm’n of Town of Brookfield, 112 F.Supp.2d 233, 236 (D.
Conn. 2000) (citing Cellular Tel. Co. v. Town of Oyster Bay, 166 F.3d 490, 493 (2d Cir. 1999)).
161
  Cellular Tel. Co. v. Town of Oyster Bay, 166 F.3d 490, 493 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Universal 
Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951) (citations to Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 
U.S. 61, 68 (1981) and 47 U.S.C. §§ 332(c)(7)(A) and (B)(v) omitted).
162
 Southwestern Bell Mobile Systems, Inc. v. Todd, 244 F.3d 51, 58 (1st Cir. 2001).
163 Cellular Tel. Co. v. Town of Oyster Bay, 166 F.3d 490, 494 (2d Cir.1999).
164
 Omnipoint Corp. v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Pine Grove Twp., 181 F.3d 403, 407-408 (3rd Cir. 
1999).
165
 Telespectrum, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 227 F.3d 414, 423 (6th Cir.2000).
166 Preferred Sites, LLC v. Troup County, 296 F.3d 1210 (11th Cir. 2002).
167 Id. at 1218 (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).
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than when reviewing under the arbitrary and capricious standard.”168 In evaluating whether the 
standard is met, “a court should view the record in its entirety, including evidence unfavorable to 
the state or local government’s decision.”169
Another approach is that embodied in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit’s 
opinion in AT&T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. City Council of Virginia Beach.170 The wireless provider 
and a church claimed that the denial of a conditional use permit to construct two 135-foot towers 
on church land in a heavily forested residential area violated the Siting Policy. The planning 
commission unanimously (with one abstention) voted to recommend approval of the permit after 
hearings, but the city council received a petition against it from 700 landowners and 
unanimously turned it down.171 The Fourth Circuit held that the U.S. District Court had been in 
error when it when it concluded that the city counsel’s decision must include “findings of fact 
and an explanation of the decision.172 While the Siting Policy demanded that decisions be in 
writing, that “cannot reasonably be inflated into a requirement of a ‘statement of ... findings and 
conclusions, and the reasons or basis therefor,’” as the explicit requirements of the APA
dictate.173
More fundamentally, however, the Fourth Circuit disagreed substantive view that the city 
council should be held to the same standard as an administrative agency. Instead, it adopted a 
“reasonable legislator” test:
The Virginia Beach City Council is a state legislative body, not a federal administrative 
agency. The “reasonable mind” of a legislator is not necessarily the same as the 
“reasonable mind” of a bureaucrat, and one should keep the distinction in mind when 
168 Id. (citing Color Pigments Mfrs. Ass’n, Inc. v. OSHA, 16 F.3d 1157, 1160 (11th Cir.1994)).
169 Id. (citing Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 523 (1981).
170
 155 F.3d 423 (4th Cir. 1998).
171 Id. at 425. See supra text accompanying note 68.
172 Id. at 429.
173 Id. at 429-430 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 557(c)).
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attempting to impose the “substantial evidence” standard onto the world of legislative 
decisions. It is not only proper but even expected that a legislature and its members will 
consider the views of their constituents to be particularly compelling forms of evidence, 
in zoning as in all other legislative matters. These views, if widely shared, will often 
trump those of bureaucrats or experts in the minds of reasonable legislators.
In light of these principles, the City Council’s decision clearly does not violate the 
“substantial evidence” requirement. . . . Appellees correctly point out that both the 
Planning Department and the Planning Commission recommended approval. In addition, 
appellees of course had numerous experts touting both the necessity and the minimal 
impact of towers at the Church. Such evidence surely would have justified a reasonable 
legislator in voting to approve the application, and may even amount to a preponderance 
of the evidence in favor of the application, but the repeated and widespread opposition of 
a majority of the citizens of Virginia Beach who voiced their views--at the Planning 
Commission hearing, through petitions, through letters, and at the City Council meeting--
amounts to far more than a “mere scintilla” of evidence to persuade a reasonable mind to 
oppose the application. Indeed, we should wonder at a legislator who ignored such 
opposition. In all cases of this sort, those seeking to build will come armed with exhibits, 
experts, and evaluations. Appellees, by urging us to hold that such a predictable barrage 
mandates that local governments approve applications, effectively demand that we 
interpret the Act so as always to thwart average, nonexpert citizens; that is, to thwart 
democracy. The district court dismissed citizen opposition as “generalized concerns.”
Congress, in refusing to abolish local authority over zoning of personal wireless services, 
categorically rejected this scornful approach.174
Going beyond the Fourth Circuit preference for local autonomy, Judge Paul Niemeyer’s 
concurring opinion in Petersburg Cellular Partnership v. Board of Supervisors of Nottoway 
County175 asserted that the Siting Policy “substantial evidence” test violates the Tenth 
Amendment.176 Judge Niemeyer noted that the Supremacy clause of the U.S. Constitution177
requires state courts to apply federal law.178 “But the requirement that state courts apply federal 
law is materially different from the proposition that state zoning boards use federally mandated 
174 Id. at 430-431 (emphasis added).
175
 205 F.3d 688 (4th Cir. 2000)
176 Id. at 699-705 (Niemeyer, J., concurring).
177 U.S. CONST. Art. VI, cl. 2.
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standards in their legislative processes.”179 Furthermore, “the imposition of a federal standard on 
a local board confuses the electorate as to which governmental unit, federal or local, is to be 
accountable for a legislative decision made by the local board.”180 The Fourth Circuit view might 
dispel at least some of the concern of those commentators who thought that the Siting Policy
might subsume all local autonomy.181
While the Fourth Circuit test and Niemeyer concurrence stress local legislative 
autonomy, courts applying the APA “substantial evidence” test presume that local land use 
regulation is a quasi-judicial function. The Third Circuit quoted the Fourth Circuit’s AT&T 
Wireless182  language celebrating legislative autonomy in Omnipoint Corp. v. Zoning Hearing 
Board of Pine Grove Township.183 It continued by quoting approvingly from the Seventh 
Circuit’s opinion in Aegerter v. City of Delafield184which, the Third Circuit said, “characterized 
zoning permit decisions as primarily administrative in nature.”185 The Seventh Circuit had
declared:
[T]rue as the AT & T Wireless observation may be about legislators, it overlooks the fact
that municipal councils often wear several hats when they act. When they are passing 
178
 205 F.3d at 704 (Niemeyer, J., concurring).
179 Id. (emphasis in original).
180 Id. at 700 (Niemeyer, J., concurring).
181 See, e.g., Matthew N. McClure, Comment, Working Through the Static: Is There Anything Left to 
Local Control in the Siting of Cellular and PCS Towers After the Telecommunications Act of 1996?, 44 
VILL. L. REV. 781, 786 (1999). 
182
 AT&T Wireless  PCS, Inc. v. City Council of Virginia Beach, 155 F.3d 423 (4th Cir. 1998). “The 
Virginia Beach City Council is a state legislative body, not a federal administrative agency.... It is not 
only proper but even expected that a legislature and its members will consider the views of their 
constituents to be particularly compelling forms of evidence, in zoning as in all other legislative matters. 
These views, if widely shared, will often trump those of bureaucrats or experts in the minds of reasonable 
legis lators.” Id. at 430. For a longer excerpt, see supra text accompanying note 174.
183
 181 F.3d 403, 408 (3rd Cir. 1999).
184
 174 F.3d 886 (7th Cir.1999).
185
 181 F.3d at 408.
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ordinances or other laws, they are without a doubt legislators, but when they sit as an 
administrative body making decisions about zoning permits, they are like any other 
agency the state has created. We therefore apply the conventional substantial evidence 
standard to the case before us.186
For land use aficionados, the debate as to whether the authorization of wireless 
communications towers by local legislatures is quasi-judicial or legislative in nature is but one 
reflection of the controversy concerning the standards by which small-scale rezoning of any sort 
is to be adjudicated. Insofar as the U.S. Constitution is concerned, the comprehensive zoning of a 
community has been legislative in nature, and thus entitled to deference, since the seminal case 
of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.187 On the other extreme, the exaction of property in exchange for 
the issuance of development permits by local administrative agencies is subject to the 
requirements that the exaction be imposed upon an individualized determination that it is roughly 
proportional to the burden that would be imposed by the new land use.188 The Supreme Court has 
shied away from imposing the same test on local legislative determinations, although it is not 
clear if there is any basis for a distinction between administrative and legislative determinations 
for Fifth Amendment Takings Clause purposes.189 There is state precedent stating that legislative 
small-scale exactions violate the Takings Clause.190
The states, for the most part, have deemed all zoning, even small-scale rezoning, to be a 
legislative function.191 However, some states, primarily out of concern with the abuses generally 
associated with “spot zoning,” treat small-scale land use planning enactments as “quasi-judicial”
186
 174 F.3d at 889
187
 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
188
 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
189 See Parking Ass’n of Ga. v. City of Atlanta, 515 U.S. 1116, 1116 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting 
from denial of certiorari).
190
 Amoco Oil Co. v. Village of Schaumburg, 661 N.E.2d 380 (Ill. App. 1995), appeal denied, 667 
N.E.2d 1055 (Ill. 1996) (table).
191 See, e.g., Arnel Dev. Co. v. City of Costa Mesa, 620 P.2d 565 (Cal. 1980); South Gwinett Venture 
v. Pruitt, 491 F.2d 5 (5th Cir.); Mahoney v. O’Shea Funeral Homes, Inc., 380 N.E.2d 297 (N.Y. 1978).
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or “administrative” under some circumstances. In Fasano v. Board of Commissioners of 
Washington County,192 the Supreme Court of Oregon declared:
[W]e feel we would be ignoring reality to rigidly view all zoning decisions by local 
gov erning bodies as legislative acts to be accorded a full presumption of validity and 
shielded from less than constitutional scrutiny by the theory of separation of powers. 
Local and small decision groups are simply not the equivalent in all respects of state and 
national legislatures. There is a growing judicial recognition of this fact of life: “It is not 
a part of the legislative function to grant permits, make special exceptions, or decide 
particular cases. Such activities are not legislative but administrative, quasi-judicial, or 
judicial in character. To place them in the hands of legislative bodies, whose acts as such 
are not judicially reviewable, is to open the door completely to arbitrary government.” . . 
.
193
Interestingly, even precedent within a given State might be torn between the desire to 
protect the almost-plenary authority on land use matters accorded local legislatures on the one 
hand, and the graft and abuse often associated with spot zoning on the other. Virginia is a 
germane case in point. The Fourth Circuit, in establishing its “reasonable legislator” rule in 
AT&T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. City Council of Virginia Beach,194 stressed the importance of the 
legislative function. Similarly, in his concurring opinion in Petersburg Cellular Partnership v. 
Board of Supervisors of Nottoway County,195 Judge Niemeyer quoted a 1975 Virginia Supreme 
Court decision in City of Richmond v. Randall,196 which the Virginia court subsequently 
reaffirmed,197 stressing that “the courts have ‘no power to rezone land to any classification or to 
192507 P.2d 23 (Or. 1973), disapproved of on other grounds, Neuberger v. City of Portland, 607 P.2d 
722 (Or. 1980); superseded by statute, Menges v. Board of County Comm’rs of Jackson County, 606 P.2d 
681 (Ore. App. 1980).
193Id. at 26 (citations omitted).
194
 155 F.3d 423 (4th Cir. 1998).
195
 205 F.3d 688 (4th Cir. 2000)
196
 554 S.E.2d 56 (Va. 1975).
197
 Tran v. Gwinn, 554 S.E.2d 63, 69 (Va. 2001) (citing Randall).
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order a legislative body to do so.’”198 At the very same time, there is a clear line of cases in 
Virginia prohibiting local legislatures from engaging in small-scale rezoning unless there is a 
demonstrable mistake in the original comprehensive zoning or change in circumstances.199
“With respect to the validity of a piecemeal downzoning ordinance such as that here 
involved, we are of opinion that when an aggrieved landowner makes a prima facie 
showing that since enactment of the prior ordinance there has been no change in 
circumstances substantially affecting the public health, safety, or welfare, the burden of 
going forward with evidence of such mistake, fraud, or changed circumstances shifts to 
the governing body. If the governing body produces evidence sufficient to make 
reasonableness fairly debatable, the ordinance must be sustained. If not, the ordinance is 
unreasonable and void. . . . .”200
The import of these Virginia cases is that comprehensive zoning is the prerogative of the 
local legislature, whereas small-scale rezoning, often condemned as “spot zoning,” will be more 
carefully reviewed by the courts. In a sense, the problem elucidated in Judge Niemeyer’s 
Nottoway concurrence,201 asserting that the TCA “substantial evidence” test violates the Tenth 
Amendment,202 is not unlike that wrestled with some courts as to whether to apply the Fasano
distinction,203 permitting legislatures to act as legislatures most of the time, but insisting that they 
act as administrative tribunals at other. 204
The judicial split over the “substantial evidence” test is emblematic of the recursive 
character of the TCA siting provisions. Those Circuits favoring APA position have said that 
“[s]ubstantial evidence review under the TCA does not create a substantive federal limitation 
198
 205 F.3d at 700 (Niemeyer, J., concurring) (quoting Randall, 211 S.E.2d at 61).
199 See, e.g., Seabrooke Partners v. City of Chesapeake, 393 S.E.2d 191 (Va. 1990); 
200
 Turner v. Bd. of County Sup’rs of Pr. William County, 559 S.E.2d 683, 687 (Va. 2002) (quoting 
Board of Sup’rs of Fairfax County v. Snell, 202 S.E.2d 889, 893 (Va. 1974).
201
 Petersburg Cellular Partnership v. Bd. of Sup’rs of Nottoway County, 205 F.3d 688 (4th Cir. 2000).
202 Id. at 699-705 (Niemeyer, J., concurring).
203
 Fasano v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Washington County, 507 P.2d 23 (Or. 1973).
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upon local land use regulatory power.”205 Likewise, the substantive standard, to which the 
“substantial evidence” inquiry is directed, is taken from “established principles of state and local 
law.”206 Thus, Federal law specifies the degree or quantum of evidence needed to legitimize, 
under federal law, the exercise of legislative powers, devolved upon local boards, under state 
law, to enforce substance rights established, by state law.
The application of the APA test to Section 704 has been criticized because its preference 
for formal fact finding and objective evidence “prevents a [local] board from balancing properly 
a proposed tower’s potential harm and the utility of improved wireless services.”207 In addition to 
aesthetics and potential effects on property values not being easily reducible to empirical data, 
the argument has it, “courts applying the APA test preclude a board from relying on residents’
opinions in deciding whether to grant a tower siting permit.”208
The notion that the data of experts was to be preferred over the feelings of people  was 
rejected by the Fourth Circuit in the AT & T Wireless Virginia Beach case.209 “Congress, in 
refusing to abolish local authority over zoning of personal wireless services, categorically 
rejected this scornful approach.”210
204 See, e.g., Board of County Commissioners of Brevard County v. Snyder, 627 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 
1993); Martin County v. Yusem, 690 So.2d 1288 (Fla. 1997).
205 Southwestern Bell Mobile Sys., Inc. v. Todd, 244 F.3d 51, 58 (1st Cir. 2001) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).
206 Preferred Sites, LLC v. Troup County, 296 F.3d 1210, 1219 (11th Cir.2002) (quoting Cellular Tel. 
Co. v. Town of Oyster Bay, 166 F.3d 490, 494 (2nd Cir. 1999), quoting in turn,  (quoting Cellular Tel. 
Co. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 24 F.Supp.2d 359, 366 (D. N.J. 1998)).
207
 Christopher P. Terry, On the Frontiers of Knowledge: A Flexible Substantial Evidence Standard of 
Review for Zoning Board Tower Siting Decisions, 20 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 147, 156 (2002).
208 Id.
209
 AT&T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. City Council of Virginia Beach, 155 F.3d 423, 430 (4th Cir. 1998) 
(legislators will “consider the views of their constituents to be particularly compelling forms of 
evidence”).
210 Id. at 431.
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More broadly, the concern that data unfairly overcomes intuitions permeates the 
controversy over the employment of cost-benefit analysis, which has become a standard tool for 
discerning the efficacy of regulatory policy.211 Some assert that the methodology of cost-benefit 
analysis is flawed because of problems involving the incommensurability of different values, 
including hedonic values; consequentialist ethics; appropriate discount rates (if any) for future 
enjoyment of resources; distributional issues, which center around whether willingness to pay is 
the appropriate proxy of demand; and survey and measurement errors.212 With respect to the 
environment, often raised in the tower citing context, deep ecologists have rejected the use of 
cost-benefit analysis in toto.213
Assertions about environmental values and the value of the environment are expressed 
with considerable conviction. Aesthetic and other claims based on the enjoyment of nature by 
present and future generations are not falsifiable, hence not scientific in nature,214 and hence not 
amenable to rigorous judicial review. That notwithstanding, courts applying the APA approach 
have vindicated aesthetic objections to tower siting, even when the objections are not supported
by declines in market value. It is sufficient that the decision seems grounded in objections to the 
particular tower.215 On the other hand, courts have not been supportive of articulated negative 
views about towers in general or that evidenced a misunderstanding of what the tower actually 
211 See, e.g., Jason Scott Johnston, A Game Theoretic Analysis of Alternative Institutions for 
Regulatory Cost-Benefit Analysis, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1343 (2002) (discussing growth of cost-benefit 
analysis).
212 See generally, Robert H. Frank, Why Is Cost-Benefit Analysis So Controversial?, 29 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 913 (2000).
213 Edwin R. McCullough, Through the Eye of a Needle: The Earth’s Hard Passage Back to Health, 
10 J. Envtl. L. & Litig. 389 (1995) “If access to nature is a right, then cost-benefit analysis breaks down. 
In other words, there is no amount of money which can compensate for irreversible and irreparable 
damage to nature.” Id. at 436-437.
214 See KARL R. POPPER, CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS: THE GROWTH OF SCIENTIFIC 
KNOWLEDGE 33-59 (3d ed. 1969).
215
 Southwestern Bell Mobile Systems, Inc. v. Todd, 244 F.3d 51, 61 (1st Cir. 2001).
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would look like.216 Nor have the courts supported aesthetic objections that were demonstrably 
without substance.217
7. No Regulation Based on “Radio Frequency Emissions”
The Siting Policy prohibits states and localities from  denying wireless tower siting 
permits for environmental reasons based on radio frequency emissions that comply with FCC 
standards.218 The Siting Policy therefore precludes “health concerns from radio emissions.”219
Furthermore, local attempts to regulate the “operation” of wireless communications towers, 
based on emissions considerations, also were reasonably interpreted by the FCC to fall under the 
same prohibition.220 While the Siting Policy emissions provision mentions “placement, 
construction, and modification,” but not operations, it is only in the area of “placement, 
construction, and modification” that the TCA makes an exception to its general preference for 
plenary FCC rulemaking.221 However, a public entity can refuse to license or otherwise permit 
the construction of a communications tower on its own property based on health concerns. The 
denial then would be proprietary rather than regulatory in nature.222
216
 Cellular Tel. Co. v. Town of Oyster Bay, 166 F.3d 490 (2nd Cir. 1999).
217 See Omnipoint Corp. v. Zoning Hearing Board of Pine Grove Township, 181 F.3d 403, 406 (3rd 
Cir. 1999) (noting that 114-foot tower was surrounded by 80 to 90-foot tall trees and would only be 
visible to neighbors 600 feet away).
218
 No State or local government or instrumentality thereof may regulate the placement, construction, 
and modification of personal wireless service facilities on the basis of the environmental effects of radio 
frequency emissions to the extent that such facilities comply with the Commission’s regulations 
concerning such emissions.
219
 AT & T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. City Council of City of Virginia Beach, 155 F.3d 423, 431 n. 6 (4th 
Cir.1998).
220
 Cellular Phone Taskforce v. FCC, 205 F.3d 82, 95-96 (2nd Cir. 2000) (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. 
V. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.11, 844 (1984) (requiring deferential 
review of agency construction of statute it is charged with administrating).
221 Id.
222 See  Sprint Spectrum L.P. v. Mills, 283 F.2d 404 (2nd Cir. 2002).
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8. Expedited Review and Relief
Section 704 provides that persons directly affected by state or local wireless tower 
permitting decisions, or failure to act, may seek expedited review in federal or state court.223 It
has been interpreted to vest U.S. district courts with sufficient authority to grant mandamus relief 
if such relief is warranted under the circumstances.224 In light of the requirement for such 
expedition, courts finding for the telecommunications provider generally order the issuance of 
the requested permit rather than remand for additional proceedings. Such a remand “would 
simply further delay resolution of the issue.”225 There is a substantial split among the courts as to 
whether landowners and wireless providers may seek relief under the federal Civil Rights Act 
(Section 1983).226
However, the TCA’ s provision of a right of action for wireless telephone providers 
denied permission to locate transmission towers in desired locations, did not provide right of 
action to persons aggrieved by decision to allow towers.227
223
 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(v). “Any person adversely affected by any final action or failure to act by 
a State or local government or any instrumentality thereof that is inconsistent with this subparagraph may, 
within 30 days after such action or failure to act, commence an action in any court of competent 
jurisdiction. The court shall hear and decide such action on an expedited basis. Any person adversely 
affected by an act or failure to act by a State or local government or any instrumentality thereof that is 
inconsistent with clause (iv) [environmental effects of radio frequency omissions] may petition the 
Commission for relief.” Id.
224
 Sprint Spectrum L.P. v. Jefferson County, 968 F.Supp. 1457 (N.D. Ala. 1997).
225
 Primeco Personal Communications v. City of Mequon, 242 F.Supp.2d 567, 582 (E.D. Wis. 2003).
226 See, e.g., Omnipoint Communications, Inc. v. City of White Plains, 175 F.Supp.2d 697, 707 
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (yes); SBA Comm. Inc. v. Zoning Comm’n of the Town of Franklin, 164 F.Supp.2d 280, 
294-295 (D.Conn. 2001) (same); Primeco Personal Communications v. City of Mequon, 242 F.Supp.2d 
567 (E.D. Wis. 2003) (no); Quest Corp. v. City of Santa Fe, New Mexico, 224 F.Supp.2d 1305 (D.N.M. 
2002) (same). 
227
 Mason v. O’Brien, 2002 WL 31972190 (N.D.N.Y. 2002) (not reported in F.Supp.2d).
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C. Should the Williamson County Ripeness Rules Apply to Section 704 Cases?
1. The Supreme Court’s Williamson County Test
In the seminal case of Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton 
Bank,228 the Supreme Court reviewed the claim that denial of permits for residential development 
constituted a taking for which just compensation was required under the Fifth Amendment.229
The Court  held that the developer “has not shown that the [state] inverse condemnation 
procedure is unavailable or inadequate, and until it has utilized that procedure, its taking claim is 
premature.”230
The result of Williamson County has been that regulatory takings cases are subject to “a 
special ripeness doctrine applicable only to constitutional property rights claims.”231 The 
Williamson County test has two prongs. The first provides that “a claim that the application of 
government regulations effects a taking of a property interest is not ripe until the government 
entity charged with implementing the regulations has reached a final decision regarding the 
application of the regulations to the property at issue.”232 The second prong requires that the 
owner seek just compensation in sate courts.233
228
 473 U.S. 172 (1985). Williamson County also contains a second test. here the property owner 
alleges that the governmental action constituted a taking. 
229 U.S. CONST. amend. V (“nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation”).
230
 473 U.S. at 197.
231
 Timothy V. Kassouni, The Ripeness Doctrine and the Judicial Relegation of Constitutionally 
Protected Property Rights , 29 CAL. W. L. REV. 1, 2 (1992).
232 Id. at 186.
233 Id. at 194-195. The owner must “seek compensation through the procedures the State has provided 
for doing so.”
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1. Should Williamson County Apply to TCA Determinations ?
Section 704 explicitly provides that aggrieved parties can challenge state and local 
wireless communications tower siting determination in federal court.234 Thus, it might seem that 
Williamson County is not a bar to federal judicial review. However, the right to sue is triggered 
by a “final action or failure to act.”235 Therefore, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit recently determined, in Sprint Spectrum L.P. v. City of Carmel,236 that the “final 
decision” prong of Williamson County is applicable to TCA siting challenges.
In one sense, it is no surprise that the Seventh Circuit’s Carmel opinion discerns “no 
significant difference” between the evolution of the regulatory takings ripeness doctrine in 
Williamson County and its progeny and the application of the doctrine to telecommunications 
tower siting. As the court noted, Seventh Circuit precedent indeed has “read Williamson
broadly,”237 excepting from its purview only land use cases involving equal protection claims 
involving fundamental rights, a suspect class, or demonstrated governmental conduct impossible 
to reconcile with legitimate objectives.238 Emblematic of its approach was the brush-off of one 
owner’s claim that land use regulations violated the Fourteenth Amendment with the sentence: 
“This case presents a garden-variety zoning dispute dressed up in the trappings of constitutional 
law.”239
234
 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(v) (“Any person adversely affected by any final action or failure to act by 
a State or local government . . . that is inconsistent with this subparagraph may, within 30 days after such 
action or failure to act, commence an action in any court of competent jurisdiction. . . .”) 
235 Id.
236
 361 F.3d 998 (7th Cir. 2004).
237 City of Carmel, 361 F.3d at 1002 (quoting Forseth v. Village of Sussex, 199 F.3d 363, 370 (7th 
Cir.2000)).
238 Id.
239
 Coniston Corp. v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 467 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding rejection 
of site plan not deprivation of substantive or procedural due process).
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Sprint, a national provider of wireless telephone services, sought to improve its service in 
the Indianapolis area by leasing the right to place an antenna on the land of Dr. Edwin Zamber, a 
city resident. “Carmel is just a stone’s throw north of Indianapolis, and Zamber already had an 
existing 135-foot-high ham radio tower on his property which met Sprint’s technical 
requirements.”240 Sprint received an improvement location permit from Carmel, allowing it to
install low-profile antennae on the sides of Zamber’s tower and to construct a ground-level 
equipment shelter. A neighbor objected and Carmel revoked the permit on the grounds that the 
access road that Sprint was installing required an access easement and subdivision and primary 
plat amendments.241 After a state court found Sprint’s subdivision appeal timely, and having held 
multiple hearings, the Board of Zoning Appeals determined that a commercial antenna was not a 
permitted use in the residential district, and that Sprint would have to obtain a special use permit, 
as well as subdivision plat approval from the Plan Commission.242 Sprint then sought mandamus 
and other relief in federal court claiming, inter alia, that the BZA’s actions violated the Siting 
Policy, since they were not supported by substantial evidence and unreasonably discriminated 
against Sprint.243 The trial court, noting that Sprint still could apply for a special use permit, 
dismissed the case under the “final decision” rule of Williamson County.”244
The Seventh Circuit began by noting that Carmel concerned one Section 704 issue, 
“when is a land use decision a ‘final action’ in order to create federal subject matter jurisdiction. 
Specifically, we must examine whether the Act modifies the traditional analysis, enunciated in 
Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank, for determining when a 
complaint challenging a local land use decision is ripe for federal adjudication.”245 Section 704
240 361 F.3d at 1000.
241 Id.
242 Id.
243 Id.
244 Id. at 1001.
245 Id. at 1000 (citing Williamson County, 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
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provides that “an action can be brought in ‘any court of competent jurisdiction’ by ‘[a]ny person 
adversely affected by any final action or failure by a State or local government or any 
instrumentality thereof that is inconsistent with [§332(c)(7)] ....’”246 It added that “[t]he normal 
rule of statutory construction is that if Congress intends for legislation to change the 
interpretation of a judicially created concept, it makes that intent specific.”247 The court added 
that “the existence of a case and controversy is a prerequisite for the exercise of federal judicial 
power” and that “[t]he [ripeness] doctrine’s basic rationale ‘is to prevent the courts, through 
avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over 
administrative policies, and also to protect the agencies from judicial interference until an 
administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the 
challenging parties.’”248
“Based on these principles, the Supreme Court has adopted [the Williamson County]
specific ripeness requirements for cases challenging land use decisions.”249 “Noticeably,” the 
court added, “with regard to challenges to land use decisions, ‘[t]his Circuit has read Williamson
broadly ....’”250 “[W]e see no significant difference simply because Sprint’s claim arises from a 
statute rather than the Constitution. 
The Seventh Circuit recognized that the Williamson County ripeness rules are not the 
“more general” ripeness standards, nor are they the same as the specific ripeness standards 
specified by other statutes.251 It grounded its decision to use the Williamson County rules in the 
TCA’ s statutory provisions and legislative intent.
246
  47 U.S.C. §  332(c)(7)(B)(v) (brackets and emphasis by Seventh Circuit).
247
 361 F.3d at 1001 (quoting Midlantic Nat’l Bank v. N.J. Dep’t of E.P., 474 U.S. 494, 501 (1986) 
(internal citation omitted)).
248 Id. at 1002 (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1967)).
249 Id. 
250 Id. (quoting Forseth v. Village of Sussex, 199 F.3d 363, 370 (7th Cir.2000)).
251 Id. at 1003.
Eagle, Wireless Telecommunications, Infrastructure Security, and the NIMBY Problem
Draft of 9/3/2004 Please do not cite or quote without permission.
47
. . . although creating a federal cause of action, Congress explicitly ensured that the Act 
would not intrude upon the traditional authority of local governments over land use 
matters. As codified, § 332(c)(7) is entitled “Preservation of local zoning authority.” That 
section expressly states that “[e]xcept as provided in this paragraph, nothing in [the] Act 
shall limit or affect the authority of a State or local government or instrumentality thereof 
over decisions regarding the placement, construction, and modification of personal 
wireless service facilities.”252
The court then noted that the original House provision would have allowed the FCC total 
authority over tower siting, but that the final bill, as the Conference Committee explained, 
preserves the authority of State and local governments over zoning and land use matters except 
in the limited circumstances set forth in the conference agreement.”253 Furthermore, the 
Conference Committee’s report defined “final action” as meaning “final administrative action at 
the State or local government level so that a party can commence action under the [Act] rather 
than waiting for the exhaustion of any independent State court remedy otherwise required.”254
Sprint asserted that reading Williamson County into the TCA “would create too many 
time-consuming procedural hurdles,” thus defeating the Act’s intent of encouraging the “rapid 
deployment” of wireless communications.255 This intent is furthered by three other provisions of 
the Act; that local authorities act on siting requests within a “reasonable period of time,”256 that 
providers must file claims under the Act within 30 days,257 and that the federal courts hear such 
claims on an expedited basis.258 Based on these, Sprint urged that the TCA’s requirement for 
252 Id.
253 Id. (quoting H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-458, at 207 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 124, 221-
22.
254 Id. (quoting H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-458, at 9 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 124, 223.)
255 Id. (citing 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(3)(A)).
256 Id. (citing 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(ii)).
257 Id. (citing 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(ii)).
258 Id. (citing 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(v)). 
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“final action” requires only that the service provider “obtain a definitive ruling from the local 
government sole on the issues presented to the local authorities.”259
The court disagreed, based upon its conclusion that Congress “did not intend to modify 
the traditional ripeness requirements for challenging local land use decisions” embodied in 
Williamson County.260 The court added that, while Williamson County requires that an owner 
“must exhaust all available state remedies for compensation prior to bringing taking claim to 
federal court,”261 the Conference Committee interpreted “final action” under the TCA siting 
provisions as meaning “final administrative action at the State or local government level so that a 
party can commence action under the [Act] rather than waiting for the exhaustion of any 
independent State court remedy otherwise required.”262 “This exercise,” it added, “clearly 
teaches that Congress was aware of Williamson County and knew how to modify its holding 
when that is what it wanted to do.”263
The second (state compensation) prong of Williamson County requires that the landowner 
litigate for compensation up through the state supreme court, if permitted to do so.264 The reason 
is that “if a State provides an adequate procedure for seeking just compensation, the property 
owner cannot claim a violation of the Just Compensation Clause until it has used the procedure 
and been denied just compensation.”265 The first (finality) prong of Williamson County provides 
that “a claim that the application of government regulations effects a taking of a property interest 
259 Id.
260 Id.
261 Id. at 1004 (citing Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 193-194).
262 Id (quoting H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-458, at 9 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 124, 223 
(brackets by the court).
263 Id.
264 Williamson County, 473 U.S. 172, 194 (“A second reason the taking claim is not yet ripe is that 
respondent did not seek compensation through the procedures the State has provided for doing so”).
265 Id. at 195.
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is not ripe until the government entity charged with implementing the regulations has reached a 
final decision regarding the application of the regulations to the property at issue.”266 Although at 
least one state, California, requires judicial review of administrative determinations for finality 
ripeness,267 it is not clear if that applies beyond inverse condemnation claims.
Read with this caveat in mind, the sparse language of the Conference Committee report 
could mean either that (1) Congress was precluding what generally would be the expansion of 
Williamson County to include state litigation of local land use decisions as well as local denials 
of compensation, or (2) that Congress was evincing its general concern that local land use 
decisions be expedited. The failure of the Conference Committee report to make explicit 
reference to Williamson County suggests that the second interpretation is more accurate.
2. The Convolution of Williamson County Subprongs
The invocation of the beguiling word “finality” masks a multitude of complexities. First, 
it is not in the local land use regulator’s interest to give the “final” determination that would 
satisfy the Williamson County finality requirement. As Justice Brennan noted in his seminal 
dissent in San Diego Gas & Electric Company v. City of San Diego,268 regulators employ delay 
as an administrative tool precisely to thwart development.269 Second, given the multitude of 
incommensurate variables that enter into a planning decision, the very concept of a “final”
determination that a specified quantity of development would be allowed is alien to the planning 
process.
What is supposedly needed is a “final” determination of what the regulator will allow the 
property owner to do on his land. As most planners will tell you, however, that is not a 
planner’s job. The planner’s job is to draw an abstract plan and then determine whether a 
266 Id. at 186 (emphasis added).
267
 Hensler v. City of Glendale, 876 P.2d 1043 (Cal. 1994). 
268450 U.S. 621, 655 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
269 Id. at 655 & n.22 (noting that city attorneys were advised at a training program that, “IF ALL ELSE 
FAILS, MERELY AMEND THE REGULATION AND START OVER AGAIN”) (capitalization in 
original).
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specific development proposal meets its requirements. Anyone who thinks that he can get 
a planning agency to formally tell him what he CAN do on his land simply doesn’t 
understand the planning process.270
Furthermore, in the face of the reluctance of officials to issue “final denials” in place of 
invitations to try and try again, attempts to make operational the fuzzy concept of “finality” have 
become increasingly convoluted. In fact, in spite of its use of the term “premature” in Williamson 
County,271 the Supreme Court has never definitively ruled that there is a right, after state 
adjudication, to federal review of Fifth Amendment takings claims.272 Furthermore, the Courts of 
Appeals are divided as to whether the act of “ripening” a claim in state court itself creates issue 
and claim preclusion so as to defeat any subsequent federal judicial review.273
A development application under Williamson County must be “meaningful.” The year 
after Williamson County was decided, the Supreme Court, in MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. 
Yolo County,274 declared:
It follows from the nature of a regulatory takings claim that an essential prerequisite to its 
assertion is a final and authoritative determination of the type and intensity of 
development legally permitted on the subject property. A court cannot determine whether 
a regulation has gone “too far” unless it knows how far the regulation goes.275
270
 Michael M. Berger, Validating the Rights of Private Land Development in the Courts, 32 URB. 
LAW. 941, 954 (2000) (emphasis in original). 
271 Williamson County, 473 U.S. 172, 197 (1985).
272 See, e.g., Rainey Bros. Construction Co. v. Memphis and Shelby County Bd. of Adjustment, 528 
U.S. 871 (1999) (denying certiorari on this issue, although petition filed by leading advocates for both 
landowners and municipalities).
273 See, e.g., San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City and County of San Francisco, 364 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(barring subsequent federal review); Wilkinson v. Pitkin County Bd. of Comm’rs, 142 F.3d 1319 (10th 
Cir. 1998) (same); Santini v. Connecticut Hazardous Waste Mgmt. Serv., 342 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2003) 
(permitting subsequent federal review); Fields v. Sarasota Manatee Airport Auth., 953 F.2d 1299 (11th 
Cir. 1992) (same)).
274
 477 U.S. 340 (1986).
275 Id. at 348.
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Referring to the developer’s permit application, the Court added in MacDonald that the 
“[r]ejection of exceedingly grandiose development plans does not logically imply that less 
ambitious plans will receive similarly unfavorable reviews.”276 “The implication is not that 
future applications would be futile, but that a meaningful application has not yet been made.”277
A wireless facilities siting application for a conditional use, variance, or other permit might, 
similarly, be rejected on the grounds that the tower is too tall, to stark in design, too close to 
incompatible uses, or otherwise so blatantly violative of local norms so as not to be “meaningful”
under Williamson County and, hence, under the Siting Policy. The ex ante effect of the 
“meaningful” application requirement is that the applicant’s first proposal often is treated as the 
initial offer in a round of negotiations, and, necessarily, the applicant must submit it with that 
knowledge.
Some courts have required that the owner apply for a variance under all circumstances.278
This is not a procedure apt to prove fruitful to applicants, however, since use variances require 
that the parcel was such that any owner would suffer unique hardship without relief, and also that 
there would be no injury from the intended use to neighbors.279
One defense from onerous demands for multiple applications is the doctrine of 
“futility.”280 The Supreme Court recently defined “futility” in a practical sense in Palazzolo v. 
Rhode Island,281, noting that “once . . . the permissible uses of the property are known to a 
276 Id. at 353 n.9.
277 Id. at 353 n.8.
278 See, e.g., Lake Nacimiento Ranch Co. v. County of San Luis Obispo, 841 F.2d 872, 877 (9th Cir. 
1988).
279 See, e.g., Otto v. Steinhilber, 24 N.E.2d 851 (N.Y. 1939).
280 See, e.g., Greenbriar v. City of Alabaster, 881 F.2d 1570 (11th Cir. 1989) (parties agreed that 
property could not be developed more extensively); Herrington v. County of Sonoma, 834 F.2d 1488 (9th 
Cir. 1987) (preliminary ruling having effect of precluding development made pursuit of application 
futile).
281
 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
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reasonable degree of certainty, a takings claim is likely to have ripened.”282 Classic examples of 
futility tend to involve bad faith as well. In City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, 
Ltd.,283 the city demanded five complete site plans for a proposed development. Each time the 
landowner complied with the city’s articulated recommendations for change, the city refused to 
take “yes” for an answer and piled on new demands. The patent incredulity with which the 
justices viewed the city’s assurance that matters were complicated and that all applicants were 
treated in the manner as Del Monte Dunes undoubtedly played an important, if unarticulated, 
role in the Court’s upholding a substantial award for the landowner.284
In Town of Amherst v. Omnipoint Communications Enterprises, Inc.,285 the First Circuit 
chastised the locality that it must “face reality”: 
If the Board’s position is that it can just sit back and deny all applications, that 
position in the end could, if maintained, prove fatal to the Board rather than 
Omnipoint. Under federal law, the town can control the siting of facilities but–as 
several Board members admitted–it cannot preclude wireless service altogether. 
Nor, in the face of a vigilant district court, can the town exhaust applicants by 
requiring successive applications without giving any clue of what will do the 
trick.286
282 Id. at 620.
283
 526 U.S. 687, 721 (1999) (requirement of exhausting available postdeprivation remedies under 
United States law).
284
 City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., Official Transcript, October 7, 1998, 1998 
WL 721087. “This case is not atypical in some respects. The city was faced with a complex decision it 
had to reconcile competing interests, sift through facts, and exercise its discretion and judgment, and it 
did so.” Id. at *3 (George A. Yuhas, for Petitioner). * * * “The Court [Justice Scalia, referring to the 
number of complete applications the city required, each imposing additional demands]: Five times.” Id.
285
 173 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 1999).
286 Id. at 16-17.
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3. The Williamson County Rule and Expedited Review
There is an extensive literature devoted to parsing the complexities of the Williamson 
County rule,287 and whether federal takings questions should be decided in federal courts.288
According to Professor Daniel R. Mandelker, “federal judges have distorted the Supreme Court’s 
ripeness precedents to achieve an undeserved and unwarranted result: they avoid the vast 
majority of takings cases on their merits.”289
This provenance makes the Williamson County doctrine a notably problematic where a 
statute mandates expedited review.
D. Evaluating the TCA Siting Provisions
The present TCA facilities siting provisions have led to “costly battles” between unhappy 
neighbors and citizens groups on the one hand, and landowners desirous of making beneficial 
utilization of their parcels and wireless service providers on the other.290 The charge that the 
Siting Policy “is vague in its reach and implications and serves as the source for political, 
economic, and emotional turmoil for the wireless industry and communities alike”291 does seem 
287 See, e.g., Michael M. Berger & Gideon Kanner, The Need for Takings Law Reform: A View from 
the Trenches–A Response to Taking Stock of the Takings Debate, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 837, 874-75 
(1998); Gregory Overstreet, The Ripeness Doctrine of the Taking Clause: A Survey of Decisions Showing 
Just How Far the Federal Courts Will Go to Avoid Adjudicating Land Use Cases, 10 J. LAND USE & 
ENVTL. L. 91 (1994); Brian W. Blaesser, Closing the Federal Courthouse Door on Property Owners: The 
Ripeness and Abstention Doctrines in Section 1983 Land Use Cases, 2 HOFSTRA PROP. L.J. 73 (1988).
288 See, e.g., John J. Delaney & Duane J. Desiderio, Who Will Clean Up the “Ripeness Mess”?: A Call 
for Reform So Takings Plaintiffs Can Enter the Federal Courthouse, 31 URB. LAW. 195 (1999) (arguing 
that Congress should pass legislation easing the rules for jurisdiction of takings claims); Daniel R. 
Mandelker & Michael M. Berger, A Plea to Allow the Federal Courts to Clarify the Law of Regulatory 
Takings, 42 LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG. 3 (1990) (arguing federal takings questions should be resolved 
in federal courts).
289
 Testimony of Daniel R. Mandelker Before the House Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on 
Courts and Intellectual Property, on H.R. 1534 (1998).
290 Id.
291
 David W. Hughes, When NIMBYs Attack: The Heights to Which Communities Will Climb to 
Pre vent the Siting of Wireless Towers, 23 J. CORP. L. 469, 474 (1998).
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to be a “universal conclusion.”292 These results flow from Section 404’s rhetorical attempt to 
have it both ways–to bridge the gap between NIMBY concerns and telecommunications 
infrastructure expansion with legislation that would have local rules and practices regulated by 
federal procedural devices.
VI. BALANCING THE EQUITIES: NEW PRESUMPTIONS AND SAFE HARBOR RULES
A. The Need for Legislative Reform
In large cities, there are substantial tall structures upon or in which wireless 
communications antennae could be constructed. The local political landscape is varied as well, 
with the local legislature comprised of members who represent the interests of varied 
manufacturing, commercial, residential, and socioeconomic constituencies. In typical suburbs, on 
the other hand, the landscape is flatter, and the voting constituency consists almost entirely of  
homeowners who perceive that their property values would be adversely affected by cellular 
communications towers. Whether correct or not from any other perspective, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit’s observation about local legislators rings true as a political 
statement: “[A] legislature and its members will consider the views of their constituents to be 
particularly compelling forms of evidence, in zoning as in all other legislative matters. These 
views, if widely shared, will often trump those of bureaucrats or experts in the minds of 
reasonable legislators.”293
It is realistic to assume that NIMBY pressures will continue, and that it will retard the 
development of wireless communications services to a certain extent. There does not appear to 
be the political will, nor would it necessarily be advantageous, to have a comprehensively strict 
and preemptive federal statute regulating the development of wireless communications facilities. 
292
 Andrew B. Levy, Note, If Not Here, Where?: Wireless Facility Siting and Section 332(c)(7) of the 
Telecommunications Act, 8 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 389, 392 -393 (1999) (quoting Hughes, op. cit.).
293
 AT&T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. City Council of Virginia Beach, 155 F.3d 423, 430 (4th Cir. 1998).
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The failure to enact the House version of the facility siting provisions into law cannot be 
undone.294
Two vehicles seem most promising for furthering the growth of wireless 
telecommunications while protecting the interest of neighborhood residents. First, industry 
officials should strive for collocation of facilities and aesthetic design where practical. Local 
political leaders should realize that the interests of their constituents largely are aligned with 
broader goals of national commercial development and security. It is true, as an industry attorney 
put it, that “both parties working together can solve many siting problems.”295 “Short of 
extremely unpopular legislation pre-empting local moratoria against tower siting, only a 
cooperative effort by all parties will ensure that all interests are protected.”296 The American 
Planning Association, among other groups, has done extensive work to try to locate such 
solutions.297
On the other hand, however, the siting provisions of the TCA are too vague, confusing, 
and weak to be of much assistance.298  The challenge is to devise amendments to the TCA that 
stop short of general preemption of local land use regulation of wireless towers, but beyond 
federal controls that are procedural and that attempt to fasten themselves to the adaptable 
rulemaking of sometimes recalcitrant local legislators.
294 See supra text accompanying notes 70-85.
295
 David W. Hughes, When NIMBYs Attack: The Heights to Which Communities Will Climb to 
Pre vent the Siting of Wireless Towers, 23 J. CORP. L. 469, 500 (1998).
296 Id. at 471.
297 See the APA Web Site, http://www.planning.org/pas/telecommunications.htm.
298 See supra text accompanying notes 290-292.
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B. Suggestions for Statutory Reform of the TCA Siting Provisions
1. Burden Shifting
As described earlier,299 federal courts have been split on whether the burden of proof with 
respect to the TCA’s limitations on local regulatory authority300 falls upon the applicant or the 
municipality. A rule of statutory interpretation is to define exceptions to the general rule 
narrowly.301 While one might perceive the “limitations” provision of 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B) to 
be the exception to the “preservation of local authority” provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7), it is 
also true that the “preservation of local authority” itself is carved out from the more general 
provisions of the Communications Act.302 That provision gives plenary authority to the FCC to 
regulate wireless communications.303 In other words, being the exception to the exception, the 
Siting Policy limitations on local authority reflect the general rule.
From a political and a practical perspective, Congress approached the question of 
statutory siting provisions not as one of subordinating one set of values to another, but rather one 
of harmonizing two conflicting sets of societal values. One, encapsulated in the Commerce 
Clause,304 and in the authority of Congress to provide for homeland security,305 encourages 
wireless infrastructure development. The other, encapsulated in the concept of the federal 
299 See supra text accompanying notes 100-110.
300
 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B).
301
 QQ Need cite.
302
 QQ Need cite.
303
 QQ Need cite.
304 U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8 (The Congress shall have Power “To regulate Commerce with foreign 
Nations, and among the several States. . . .”).
305 Id., cl. 1 (“The Congress shall have Power To . . . provide for the common Defence and general 
Welfare of the United States . . .”).
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government being one of enumerated powers and in the Tenth Amendment,306 respects local 
autonomy.
Given that state and local governments have wide latitude in fashioning the substantive 
rules of land use regulation as they pertain to wireless communications towers, they should have 
the corresponding burden of demonstrating that their decisions are properly predicated on those 
rules. This proposition essentially is no different from that approved by the U.S. Supreme Court 
in City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd.,307 where the Court approved of the 
use of jury determinations of whether “the city’s particular decision to deny Del Monte Dunes’
final development proposal was reasonably related to the city’s proffered justifications.”308
1. Limitations on Time for Action on Permit Applications
The Siting Policy provides that state and local governments must act upon wireless 
facilities siting permit applications within “a reasonable period of time”309 The Supreme Court 
was reluctant to draw rigid lines for the duration of development moratoria for Takings Clause 
purposes in its recent decision in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning 
Agency.310 However, the Court noted that a number of states have specific time limits for interim 
zoning ordinances ranging from six months to two years.311 Furthermore, the Court noted that 
“[i]t may well be true that any moratorium that lasts for more than one year should be viewed 
with special skepticism.”312
306 U.S. CONST. Amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor 
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”).
307
 526 U.S. 687 (1999).
308 Id. at 706.
309
 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(ii).
310
 535 U.S. 302 (2002).
311 Id. at 342 n.37.
312 Id. at 341. 
Eagle, Wireless Telecommunications, Infrastructure Security, and the NIMBY Problem
Draft of 9/3/2004 Please do not cite or quote without permission.
58
The fact that some states already have statutory limitations pertaining to delays in issuing 
land use determinations, strongly implies that flat durational requirements are consistent with the 
exercise of valid local police powers. Long delays in making determinations not only earn 
skepticism as to underlying motives with respect to the individual applications, but also lend 
doubt as to whether delays that ostensibly are for review of applications in fact are for 
discrimination among providers or prohibitions on wireless service, both of which Section 704
already prohibits.313
Should Congress not want to impose absolute durational limitations on local review on 
the grounds that this would deprive municipalities of the ability to deal with unusual situations, it 
could temper the requirement by providing for an exception in the case of extraordinary 
circumstances, which the locality would have to justify under a “strong and convincing 
evidence” standard.314
As discussed earlier,315 the total incorporation of the Takings Clause Williamson County
doctrine316 into the TCA’s requirement that local land use regulators reach decisions within a 
“reasonable period of time after the request is duly filed”317 seems extravagant given the need to 
balance against local autonomy the national goals of facilitating commerce and homeland 
security. The requirement that courts hear Siting Policy permit denial cases “on an expedited 
basis” attests to Congressional concern about undue delay.318 The effect of Williamson County is 
to facilitate delay by transposing its context from the consideration of the permit application by 
local regulators to whether the permit application is “meaningful” so as to be duly filed. 
313
 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(i).
314
 QQ Quote definition from similar provision in U.S.C.
315 See supra text accompanying notes 287-289.
316
 Williamson County Reg’l Plan. Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
317
 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(ii).
318 Id. § 332(c)(7)(B)(v).
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A good solution to this problem might be the incorporation within the TCA siting 
provisions of the substance of Florida’s innovative “Bert J. Harris, Jr., Private Property Rights 
Protection Act.”319 Under that statute, government agencies are required to issue a written 
“ripeness decision identifying the allowable uses to which the subject property may be put.”320 In 
effect, the Bert J. Harris Act requires a locality to provide the information that the Supreme 
Court assumed that Williamson County would result in the landowner being supplied–”a final 
decision regarding how it will be allowed to develop its property.”321
The TCA could be amended to require not only that a landowner or wireless service 
provider receive a decision on a siting application within a specified time, but that, at the 
applicant’s election, a denial would have to be accompanied by a statement enumerating the
wireless facilities uses, if any, to which the property may be put. This would permit the applicant 
to file suit in a time frame consistent with Congress’s existing mandate for judicial review “on an 
expedited basis.”322 It also would satisfy the Supreme Court’s concerns in Williamson County
that a court act with full knowledge of the facts.
C. Safe Harbor Rules and Presumptions
Another approach towards amending the Siting Policy to achieve more balance is the 
increased use of statutory safe harbor rules. The existing provision ensuring that applicants can 
meet any legitimate state or local radio frequency emissions concern by complying with FCC 
319FLA. STAT. ANN. § 70.001.
320 Id. § 70.001(5)(a). “During the 180-day-notice period [prior to the owner being permitted to file an 
action] … each of the governmental entities … shall issue a written ripeness decision identifying the 
allowable uses to which the subject property may be put. The failure of the governmental entity to 
[comply shall] operate as a ripeness decision that has been rejected by the property owner. The ripeness 
decision, as a matter of law, constitutes the last prerequisite to judicial review, and the matter shall be 
deemed ripe or final for the purposes of the judicial proceeding created by this section, notwithstanding 
the availability of other administrative remedies.”
321 Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 190.
322
 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(v).
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emissions standards,323 is an example. Similar statutory rules could be put in place with respect 
to facilities to be located within existing structures or structures that primarily serve other 
functions.
Statutory presumptions could be enacted favoring towers and other wireless facilities 
located in areas zoned for industrial or commercial use, or along four- or six-lane or interstate 
highways. In areas zoned residential, presumptions might be keyed to such objective measures as 
ratios of tower height to the height of nearby structures, or the distance between the tower and 
the property line. If a permit application meets these statutory requirements, it could be 
overcome only through clear and convincing evidence.
1. Other Statutory Changes
Another approach is modification of the TCA to provide wireless communications 
service providers treatment equal of that of existing public utilities. As an illustration, in New 
York the very stringent requirements otherwise applicable for landowners seeking a use 
variance324 are subject to a “public utility” exception.325 In Cellular Telephone Co. v. 
Rosenberg,326 the New York Court of Appeals held that “a cellular telephone company is a 
‘public utility’ . . . . [and that] the construction of an antenna tower in a residential district to 
facilitate the supply of cellular telephone service is a ‘public utility building’ within the meaning 
of a zoning ordinance.”327
323 Id. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iv).
324
 Matter of Otto v. Steinhilber, 24 N.E.2d 851, 853 (N.Y. 1939) (requiring that land cannot yield a 
reasonable return if used for permissible purposes and that the plight of the owner is due to unique 
circumstances).
325
 Matter of Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc. v. Hoffman, 374 N.E.2d 105 (N.Y. 1978).  
“Instead, the utility must show that modification is a public necessity in that it is required to render safe 
and adequate service . . . . [W]here the intrusion or burden on the community is minimal, the showing 
required by the utility should be correspondingly reduced.” Id. at 111.
326
 624 N.E.2d 990 (N.Y. 1993).
327 Id. at 993.
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While the political imperatives might militate against such an approach, the TCA could 
be amended to as to preempt wireless communications facilities from local land use regulation, 
which leaving state regulation substantially undisturbed. Already, a state’s own immunity from 
local zoning laws may be shared with private firms licensed to construct communications towers 
on state land for use by wireless telecommunications providers.328 State regulation of wireless 
towers would alleviate concerns about distant and obtrusive federal intervention, while at the 
same time reducing the jockeying that might occur among adjoining communities, each seeking 
to have the other provide service to a multi-jurisdictional area from its side of the boundary line.
Another modification to the TCA that would put wireless communications service 
providers on the same footing as other utilities is to require that they be treated as favorably as 
fiber optic cable lines or other physical utility lines run along public rights of way. Although the 
use of government-owned land for wireless towers is somewhat different than the use of such of 
such areas for physical utility lines, electrical transmissions towers and above-ground amplifying 
or pumping stations suggest formulae for the equalization of access charges.
VII. CONCLUSION
In a thoughtful coda to one of its TCA facility siting decisions, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the First Circuit observed :
The statute’s balance of local autonomy subject to federal limitations does not offer a 
single “cookie cutter” solution for diverse local situations, and it imposes an unusual 
burden on the courts. But Congress conceived that this course would produce (albeit at 
some cost and delay for the carriers) individual solutions best adapted to the needs and 
desires of particular communities. If this refreshing experiment in federalism does not 
work, Congress can always alter the law.329
The FCC noted in 2003 that “the increasing presence of cable and wireless-based 
telephone services as well as the advent of broadband services and other new 
328
 Crown Communication New York v. Dept. of Transp., 765 N.Y.S.2d 898, 901 (App. Div. 2003) 
(noting that “the shared use of the towers is integral to the State plan of improving its own 
telecommunications infrastructure and furthers the State’s goal of reducing the proliferation of towers”).
329
 Town of Amherst v. Omnipoint Communications Enters., Inc., 173 F.3d 9, 17 (1st Cir. 1999).
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telecommunications and information services has already worked changes in the industry to a far 
greater extent than could have been reasonably predicted in 1996.”330
While the wireless facility siting rules of the TCA have worked to a limited extent, their
leitmotif of substantially deferential federal procedural checks engrafted upon state procedure, 
state substantive law, local ordinances, and most unrestrained local interpretation of those 
ordinances is not satisfactory. Similarly, the original House version of the facilities siting 
provisions, which imposed federal preemption, were unsatisfactory. The TCA should be 
amended along the lines suggested in this article so as to achieve a better balance between 
commerce and homeland security and local autonomy.
330 Triennial Review Order, p. 8 para. 6.
